Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules by Byers, Michael
Michigan Journal of International Law 
Volume 17 Issue 1 
1995 
Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules 
Michael Byers 
Queens' College, University of Cambridge 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil 
 Part of the International Law Commons, and the Rule of Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michael Byers, Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 109 (1995). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol17/iss1/3 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Journal of International Law at University of 
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of 
International Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
CUSTOM, POWER, AND THE
POWER OF RULES
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE
Michael Byers*
IN TRODU CTION ............................................... 110
I. POWER AND INTERNATIONAL LAW ....................... 112
A. Power and Resolutions and Declarations
as State Practice ..................................... 117
B. Power and the Scope of International Human Rights.. 119
C. Power and the Transforming Effects
of Legal System s .................................... 121
D. Power and Critical Legal Scholarship ................ 124
II. LAW, POWER, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS .......... 127
III. THE PROCESS OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
LAW AS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION .......................... 136
A. Shared Understandings of Legal Relevance ........... 139
B. Shared Understandings of the Relationship
Between Interest, Behavior, and Cost ................. 142
C. The Self-Evident Nature of Some Shared Interests ..... 145
D. Varying Degrees of Resistance to Change ............ 147
IV. CUSTOM, POWER, AND THE PRINCIPLE OF JURISDICTION .. 149
A . Internal R ules ....................................... .151
B . Boundary Rules ..................................... 153
C . External Rules ...................................... 154
V. CUSTOM, POWER, AND THE PRINCIPLE OF PERSONALITY .. 155
VI. CUSTOM, POWER, AND THE PRINCIPLE OF RECIPROCITY ... 161
* Ph.D. Candidate, Queens' College, University of Cambridge; Supervisor in Internation-
al Law, Queens' College, Christ's College and Trinity College, Cambridge; Founding
Member, Public International Law and Policy Group. B.C.L., McGill University (1992);
LL.B., McGill University (1992); B.A., University of Saskatchewan (1988).
I wish to express my thanks to Philip Allott, Blaine Baker, James Crawford, Peter
Haggenmacher, Benedict Kingsbury, Martti Koskenniemi, Claus Kress, Susan Marks, Georg
Nolte and Stephen Toope for their helpful comments on earlier drafts, to Frances Nicholson
for her editorial assistance, and to Jayaprakash Sen, whose intellectual contributions at the
early stages of this project were most significant.
This article is dedicated to Professor Jean-Guy Quenneville of St. Thomas More College
and the Department of Political Studies at the University of Saskatchewan. Professor
Quenneville, now retired, is largely responsible for my interest in legal systems and interna-
tional law.
Michigan Journal of International Law
VII. CUSTOM, POWER, AND THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGITIMATE
EXPECTATION .......................................... .165
A. State Immunity from Jurisdiction ....................... 169
B. The Breadth of the Territorial Sea ................... 173
C O N CLU SIO N ................................................. 179
INTRODUCTION
There are three parts to the title of this article. The first is "Cus-
tom," because this article is about the process of customary international
law. The process of customary international law involves the mainte-
nance, development, and change of customary rules, which constitute an
important part of the international legal system.' The second part of the
title is "Power," because this article argues that the process of customary
international law is based in large part on applications of state power,
that is, the ability of one state to compel or significantly influence the
behavior of another. The third part of the title is "the Power of Rules,"
because this article argues that the applications of state power which are
largely responsible for the maintenance, development, and change of
customary rules are themselves qualified by rules and principles of
international law. Power, as dealt with in this article, is power qualified
and transformed by the international legal system.
The first two parts of the title also typify two academic disciplines.
The first part, "Custom," symbolizes the discipline of international law,
while the second part, "Power," symbolizes the discipline of internation-
al relations. The third part of the title, "the Power of Rules," anticipates
an attempt to bridge the gap between those two disciplines.
This article begins by explaining briefly the differing perspectives
which these two general categories of scholars - those who study
international law and those who study international relations - have of
international society generally, and of law and power more specifically.
This article exposes the fact that power is an important but largely
unnoticed subject of much international legal discourse and also can-
1. This article focuses on the customary process as it operates with respect to generally
applicable international rules. The process operates in a similar manner, but with a more
restricted scope, with respect to rules of regional, or special, customary international law. For
explanations of regional or special customary international law as it has, more or less,
traditionally been understood, see Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International
Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 28-31 (1974-75); Anthony A. D'Amato, The Concept of
Special Custom in International Law, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 211 (1969); G. Cohen-Jonathan, La
coutume locale, 1961 ANNUAIRE FRAN AIS DE DROIT INT'L [A.F.D.I.] (Centre National de
Recherche Scientifique) 119; and Paul Guggenheim, Lokales Gewohnheitsrecht, 11
OSTERREICHISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR 6FFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT [O.Z.o.R.] 327
(1961).
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vasses attempts by international relations scholars to incorporate law
into their understandings of power.
An attempt is then made to synthesize the two perspectives into a
general theory of customary international law. This theory explains the
process of customary international law as a social institution created and
shaped by the shared understandings and patterned behavior of self-
interested states. According to this theory, customary rules largely arise
through the application of power by states within a framework made up
of the customary process and a number of fundamental structural princi-
ples of international law. This theory thus seeks to bring the study of
power within the scope of international legal scholarship in a way that
does not deny an important element of stability and determinacy to law.
It might also encourage some international relations scholars to regard
international law as a constraint on the exercise of power which cannot
be ignored or changed in response to short-term interests.2
With these two goals in mind, the final four sections of this article
provide examples of how certain fundamental principles of international
law qualify the application of state power in the process of customary
international law. The first of these sections considers the principle of
jurisdiction, the second the principle of personality, the third the princi-
ple of reciprocity, and the fourth the principle of legitimate expectation.
This article draws heavily on recent work in both international law
and international relations, but does not fit entirely within either domain.
Instead, it acknowledges the complexity of social relationships in a way
which might disconcert some international lawyers and international
relations scholars, who are, perhaps necessarily, accustomed to operating
within discrete spheres of analysis.3 By exploring the complex relation-
ship between customary international law and state power, this article
2. See ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 206-09 (1989); discussion infra
part II. Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley has written that "if law ... does push the behavior of
states toward outcomes other than those predicted by power and the pursuit of national
interest, then political scientists must revise their models to take account of legal variables."
Anne-Marie S. Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agen-
da, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205, 206 (1993).
3. See discussion infra p. 129. For support for an interdisciplinary approach to the study
of law, see Philip Allott, Making Sense of the Law, CAMBRIDGE REV., Mar. 1987, at 15;
Philip Allott, Making Sense of the Law, CAMBRIDGE REV., June 1987, at 65. For an acknowl-
edgment of the need for international relations scholars to engage social complexity, see
Justin Rosenberg, The International Imagination: IR Theory and 'Classic Social Analysis', 23
MILLENNIUM 85 (1994). It should also be noted that because this article deals with power as
it is qualified and transformed by the international legal system, its examination of the work
of international relations scholars focuses on that relatively small part of their literature which
has dealt with power as it is applied within the context of regimes or institutions. See
discussion infra part II.
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seeks to demonstrate that increased movement between the two disci-
plines, while not necessarily leading to better solutions to practical
problems, may well lead to better understandings of the international
society in which we live.
I. POWER AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
In adopting an interdisciplinary perspective on the process of cus-
tomary international law this article makes three assumptions which are
fundamental to that traditionally dominant school of international rela-
tions scholarship referred to as "realism." The first two of these assump-
tions are also important aspects of many modern conceptions of interna-
tional law.
First, this article makes a statist assumption: that the actors primarily
engaged in the process of customary international law are states.4 Sec-
ond, it makes a consensual assumption: that states do not become sub-
ject to international legal obligations unless they have first given their
consent. This consent, however, may come in the form of general con-
sent to the process of customary international law, and not as specific
consent to individual rules.5 Third, this article assumes that states act in
4. States are clearly not the only actors of importance on the international stage. Transna-
tional corporations, currency speculators, insurgents, criminals, terrorists and human rights
groups are all able to influence other actors, including states, in important ways. Nevertheless,
states, as the sole holders of full international legal personality, are almost entirely responsible
for the behavior which makes and changes international law, even though that behavior may
be heavily influenced by the activities of other, non-state actors. Consequently, an explanation
of a process of international law creation - in a fairly restricted sense - does not necessari-
ly have to deal with non-state actors. For similar statist positions adopted by realists, see, e.g.,
HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS (3d ed. 1965); GEORG SCHWARZEN-
BERGER, POWER POLITICS 13-15 (3d ed. 1964); KENNETH WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNA-
TIONAL POLITICS 93-97 (1979); and, for commentary, see JUSTIN ROSENBERG, THE EMPIRE
OF CIVIL SOCIETY 10-15 (1994). For examples of non-statist realist approaches, which are
only just beginning to appear, see SUSAN STRANGE, STATES AND MARKETS (1988); Virginia
Haufler, Crossing the Boundary between Public and Private: International Regimes and Non-
State Actors, in REGIME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 94 (Volker Rittberger ed.,
1993).
5. By accepting some rules of customary international law states are necessarily accept-
ing rules about how those rules are maintained, developed or changed. See PHILIP ALLOTr,
EUNOMIA: NEW ORDER FOR A NEW WORLD 145-77 (1990); JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON
AND NORMS 123-29 (1990). For particularly clear statements as to the consensual approach to
customary international law, see The Steamship Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A),
No. 9, at 18 (Sept. 7); P.E. Corbett, The Consent of States and the Sources of the Law of
Nations, 6 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 20 (1925); GODEFRIDUS J.H. VAN HOOF, RETHINKING THE
SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 76 (1983). For consensual ("contractual") language from
international relations scholars see Robert 0. Keohane, The Analysis of International Regimes,
in REGIME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 4, at 23; Friedrich
Kratochwil, Contracts and Regimes, in REGIME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
supra note 4, at 73.
[Vol. 17:109
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largely self-interested ways, and that. one, if not the primary, way in
which they promote their self-interest is the application of power.
6
In addition, this article adopts a broad definition of power. Power is
the ability of one actor to compel or significantly influence .the behavior
of another. It may be applied through the use or threat of force, through
economic incentives or penalties, or through a variety of social pres-
sures. It may be derived from a number of different sources, including
military capabilities, wealth or moral authority. It may be augmented or
constrained by concepts, values, institutions and rules. It is above all a
relational concept, in that the ability to compel or influence always
depends on the relative abilities of the different actors concerned either
to apply or resist pressure.
With few notable exceptions, legal scholars have avoided consider-
ing directly the effects of power relationships on the creation of inter-
national legal rules. Instead, they have to varying degrees generally
assumed that international law is created through processes which are at
least procedurally objective and in that sense apolitical. This assumption
of procedural objectivity is based, in turn, on the not entirely solid
concept of state equality.
The concept of state equality has been part of international legal
thought for more than two centuries.8 It finds representative expression
in Article 2(1) of the Charter of the United Nations, which states that
However, because many realists still assume that consent is required for every individual
rule and think that any effective legal system requires strong enforcement mechanisms, they
remain skeptical about whether international law has any real, "prescriptive" effect. See, e.g.,
J.S. Watson, A Realistic Jurisprudence of International Law, in YEAR BOOK OF WORLD
AFFAIRS 265 (George W. Keeton & Georg Schwarzenberger eds., 1980). For a response to the
concern about enforcement see John H.E. Fried, How Efficient is International Law?, in THE
RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF LEO GROSS 93 (Karl W. Deutsch
& Stanley Hoffmann eds., 1968).
6. This is the classic realist assumption. See, e.g., EDWARD H. CARR, THE TWENTY
YEARS' CRISIS 1919-1939, at 85-88 (2d ed. 1961); MORGENTHAU, supra note 4, at 5-8; ROB-
ERT O. KEOHANE, The Demand for International Regimes, in INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
AND STATE POWER 101 (1989).
7. The exceptions include 1 HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. McDOUGAL, JURISPRU-
DENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY 399-452 (1992); SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 4, at 198-212.
But see SCHWARZENBERGER, supra, at 506-09. For another, recent exception, see Shelley
Wright, Economic Rights, Social Justice and the State: A Feminist Reappraisal, in RECON-
CEIVING REALITY: WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 117 (Dorinda G. Dallmeyer ed., 1993)
[hereinafter Wright, A Feminist Reappraisal]. For a discussion of the similarities and differ-
ences between the ideas of Lasswell and McDougal and those advanced in this article, see
infra pp. 123-24 and note 98.
8. In 1758 Emer de Vattel wrote that "[a] dwarf is as much a man as a giant is; a small
Republic is no less a sovereign state than the most powerful Kingdom." E. DE VATTEL, THE
LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (Charles G. Fenwick trans.,
1916).
Fall 1995]
Michigan Journal of International Law
"[t]he Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of
all its Members," and it has been articulated repeatedly in the resolu-
tions and declarations of the United Nations General Assembly.9 There
is, however, an important difference between the notional, or formal,
equality of states and social equality.'0
The concept of formal equality is, in some respects, an essential
element of the international legal system. All states are entitled to
participate in the system because they are formally equal. Reciprocity, a
principle examined in some depth later in this article," has the legal
effects it does because all states are formally entitled to the same gen-
eral rights and subject to the same general obligations. In terms of law
creation, the concept of formal state equality is of particular importance
with respect to the creation of law through treaties. Formal equality
allows states to enter into these agreements with reasonable assurance
that the obligation of pacta sunt servanda, the rules of treaty interpreta-
tion, and the duty to make reparation in the event of a breach will be
applied on an equal basis. 2 Nevertheless, just as contract law in national
legal systems allows for the application of bargaining power while at the
same time regulating the interaction of economically interested parties,
the rules governing international treaties do not eliminate disparities in
either negotiating strength or the ability to impose effective retaliatory
sanctions in the event of a breach. 3 However, these rules do provide an
9. See, e.g., Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Rela-
tions and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., 1883d mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625 (1970). Note,
however, the creation of special rights for the permanent members of the Security Council in
Chapter V of the U.N. Charter, and the weighting of votes in the World Bank and Internation-
.al Monetary Fund. Articles of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(World Bank) art. 5(3)(a), 2 U.N.T.S. 39, 134; 606 U.N.T.S. 295 (July 22, 1944); Articles of
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund art. 12(5)(a)-(b), 726 U.N.T.S. 266 (July 22,
1944).
10. See James Crawford, Islands as Sovereign Nations, 38 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 277,
284-87 (1989) (explaining the difference between formal equality among states and actual
equality in terms of power and resources). The difference between formal and social equality
is also relevant to national legal systems. See, e.g., ANNE E. MORRIS & SUSAN M. No'rr,
WORKING WOMEN AND THE LAW (1991); J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE:
THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION (1979); Carol Bacchi, Do Women Need
Equal Treatment or Different Treatment?, 8 AUSTL. J.L. & Soc'Y 80 (1992). For theoretical
discussions see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 60-90 (1971) and RONALD DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 179-83, 223-39 (1977).
11. See infra part VI.
12. See generally PAUL REUTER, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TREATIES (Jos6 Mico
& Peter Haggenmacher trans., 2d ed. 1995).
13. See generally Robert Y. Jennings, What is International Law and How Do We Tell It
When We See It?, 37 SCHWEIZERISCHES JAHRBUCH FOR INTERNATIONALES RECHT [Schw.
J.i.R.] 59, 68 (1981);'Alain Pellet, The Normative Dilemma: Will and Consent in International
[Vol. 17:109
Custom, Power,. and the Power of Rules
essential element of procedural consistency, the absence of which would
have significantly constrained the enormous expansion in treaty relations
which has occurred in the latter half of the twentieth century.
The concept of formal state equality is considerably less useful with
respect to the process of customary international law which, in the
words of Oscar Schachter, "gives weight to effective power and re-
sponsibility."' 14 The customary process gives weight to power because,
rather than involving quasi-contractual agreements, it concerns patterns
of legally relevant behavior which, if not effectively opposed, may
develop into legal rules. 15 Although all states are equally entitled to
participate in the process, it is generally easier for more powerful states
to engage in behavior which will significantly affect the maintenance,
development, or change of customary rules than it is for less powerful
states to do so.16
Furthermore, as this article will later discuss, the maintenance,
development, or change of customary rules usually involves a weighing
Law-Making, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 22, 42-45 (1992). It is interesting to note that
international treaties are still considered valid even if they have been entered into under
duress, unless that duress has involved an unlawful use of force. This is not the case. with
contracts in most national legal systems. See John P. Dawson, Economic Duress - An Essay
in Perspective, 45 MICH. L. REv. 253 (1947). Power is thus even less constrained by interna-
tional treaty law than it is by most national laws of contract.
14. Oscar Schachter, Entangled Treaty and Custom, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME
OF PERPLEXITY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SHABTAI ROSENNE 717, 721 (Yoram Dinstein ed.,
1989). Schachter's sentence continues: "whereas multilateral treaty-making ... treats all
States as equally capable." Id. See also Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and
Practice, 178 RECUEIL DES COURS D'ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL [R.C.A.D.I.] 9,
26-32 (1982); Oscar Schachter, Remarks on Disentangling Treaty and Customary Internation-
al Law, 81 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROc. 157, 158, 163-464 (1987).
15. See generally H.W.A. THIRLWAY, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW AND CODIFICA-
TION (1972); KAROL WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN PRESENT INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d rev. ed. 1993);
Akehurst, supra note 1; Gennady M. Danilenko, The Theory of International Customary Law,
31 GER. Y.B. INT'L L. 9 (1988). Opposition is the only option open to a state which does not
approve of a proposed or developing rule. See Jonathan I. Charney, The Persistent Objector
Rule and the Development of Customary International Law, 56 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, I n.3
(1985); see generally I.C. MacGibbon, Customary International Law and Acquiescence, 33
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 115 (1957); I.C. MacGibbon, The Scope of Acquiescence in International
Law, 31 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 143 (1954).
16. At a very basic level, powerful states have larger, better financed diplomatic corps
and are therefore better able to follow international developments' across a wide spectrum of
issues. This enables them to support, in a timely fashion, those developments which they
perceive as furthering their interests, and to object to those developments which they view as
being contrary to those interests. If more than verbal or written statements are required,
powerful states also have the military, economic and political strength to enforce jurisdiction
claims, impose trade sanctions, and dampen or divert international criticism. However, the
ability of states to contribute to the process of customary international law may also vary
because of internal political constraints, such as those which have existed in Japan and
Germany with respect to the use of force, and the differing traditions and self-perceptions
which national societies have of their role in world events.
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of different amounts of supporting, ambivalent, and opposing behavior. 7
Power, and its relational nature, is therefore particularly important in the
process of customary international law.
Finally, states frequently choose to remove themselves from power
struggles over particular customary rules by acquiescing to new or
potential changes or developments. If, for instance, the world's most
powerful states are ambivalent with respect to a new or developing rule
and do nothing, the power relationships among less powerful but more
interested states may be determinative. 8 These power relationships will,
in turn, be qualified by the relative strengths of different sources of
power, the self-evident nature of some shared interests and the existence
of fundamental, structural principles of international law. Of course, in
some situations there is no disagreement among states as to the desir-
ability of a particular rule and therefore no opposition to it. Relative
power does not play a role in these situations, although such situations
are rare.
19
Unfortunately, many international legal scholars have ignored the
effects of power relationships on the development of customary rules, or
have made ineffective attempts to explain these effects away.20
17. See discussion infra part III.B.
18. A similar phenomenon may occur with respect to the negotiation of some multilateral
treaties. In situations where the more powerful states are less interested in the outcome of the
negotiations than some less powerful states, these weaker states may assume leading roles.
19. One example of such a situation is the development of the prohibition against
genocide. See generally Malcolm Shaw, Genocide and International Law, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY, supra note 14, at 797. Other possible examples include the
development of rules concerning the use of outer space and celestial bodies, see generally Bin
Cheng, United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: 'Instant' International Customary Law?,
5 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 23 (1965), and the rule concerning coastal state jurisdiction over the
continental shelf. See generally James Crawford & Thomas Viles, International Low on a
Given Day, in FESTSCHRIFT FUR KARL ZEMANEK 45 (1994). The absence of opposition in
these situations allows customary rules to develop very quickly and to become, in effect,
almost "instant" customary international law.
20. Anthony D'Amato, for instance, agreed that some states are better at publicizing their
actions and related legal opinions than other states and are consequently more effective in
shaping customary international law. ANTHONY A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 96-97 (1971). However, he assumed that the customary process offers
a level playing field. He claimed that "all nations have the same set of entitlements; that each
entitlement has equal legal standing vis-a-vis other entitlements; that international law strives
to preserve the equilibrium that equal entitlements create by permitting retaliation by nations
whose entitlements have been violated .... " Anthony D'Amato, The Concept of Human
Rights in International Law, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1110, 1112 (1982). As a result, "the custom-
ary rules that survive the legal evolutionary process are those that are best adapted to serve
the mutual self-interest of all states." Anthony D'Amato, Trashing Customary International
Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 101, 104 (1987) (emphasis added). D'Amato did not consider
whether the degree to which a state participates in the process - the degree to which it
protects its "entitlements" - might relate to its relative power vis-ht-vis other states. For
views similar to that of D'Amato on this point, see Akehurst, supra note 1, at 23; and, albeit
not explicitly, Danilenko, supra note 15.
[Vol. 17:109
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Schachter is one scholar who has recognized that power is an important
factor in the maintenance, development, and change of customary rules,
but nobody has expanded this insight to provide a detailed explanation
of the role of power in the process of customary international law.21
A. Power and Resolutions and Declarations as State Practice
Although most international legal scholars do not explicitly ac-
knowledge the important role played by power in the process of cus-
tomary international law, power is a central, if largely unrecognized,
part of ongoing debates on the subject. For example, scholars still
debate whether, in what way and to what degree the resolutions and
declarations of international organizations (particularly the United Na-
tions General Assembly) are able to contribute to the maintenance, de-
velopment, and change of rules of customary international law. The
traditional position, reflective of a period in which a few powerful states
dominated the international system more than any do today, provided
that resolutions and declarations are only able to contribute to the extent
that they are expressions of opinio juris, the subjective element of
customary international law.22 Some scholars even expressed doubt as to
this function, suggesting that resolutions and declarations cannot consti-
tute reliable expressions of opinio juris because state representatives fre-
quently do not believe what they say.23
21. For other, limited acknowledgments of the importance of power in the customary
process, see, e.g., V.D. Degan, Peaceful Change, 16 REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INT'L
[R.B.D.I.] 536, 549 (1981-82); Pellet, supra note 13, at 44; K. Venkata Raman, Toward a
General Theory of International Customary Law, in TOWARD WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN
DIGNITY, ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MYRES S. McDOUGAL 365, 388 (W. Michael Reisman &
Bums H. Weston eds., 1976) [hereinafter Raman, Toward a General Theory]; W. Michael
Reisman, The Cult of Custom in the Late 20th Century, 17 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 133, 144
(1987). For a call for an explanation on the role of power, see Daniel M. Bodansky, The
Concept of Customary International Law, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 667 (1995) (book review).
22. See, e.g., Georges Abi-Saab, The Development of International Law by the United
Nations, 24 REVUE EGYPTIENNE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL [R.E.D.I.] 95, 100 (1968); Rend-
Jean Dupuy, Coutume Sage et Coutume sauvage, in M9LANGES OFFERTS A. CHARLES Rous-
SEAU 75, 83-84 (1974). For more on opinio juris, see discussion infra part III.A. With respect
to changes in the international system, it seems clear that the process of decolonization, the
acquisition by non-industrialized states of a numerical majority in many international organi-
zations, the economic resurgence of Western Europe and the Pacific Rim, the end of the Cold
War, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the demise of most command economies have
reduced and rearranged the relative power advantages and disadvantages which existed in the
early post-World War II years.
23. See, e.g., Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, The Normative Role of the General Assembly of the
United Nations and the Declaration of Principles of Friendly Relations, 137 R.C.A.D.I. 419,
455-59 (1972-II).
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Since 1945 the General Assembly has become an important forum
for the newly-independent states of the non-industrialized world. These
states, however, have found themselves severely disadvantaged in a
legal system which accords greatest influence to wealth and military
strength. Attempts to change the system have enjoyed limited success.
These new states have used their numerical majority to adopt resolutions
and declarations which advance their own interests rather than those of
powerful states.24 They have also, in conjunction with a significant
number of legal scholars (and arguably the International Court of Jus-
tice), asserted that these resolutions and declarations are important in-
stances of state practice which create, or at least indicate, rules of cus-
tomary international law.25 Most powerful states and scholars from
powerful states have resisted this assertion of power by new states.26 A
compromise position may now be emerging, to the effect that resolu-
tions and declarations are instances of state practice which do not carry
as much weight as those instances of state practice that involve more
traditional forms of state action.27 In any event, it is clear that states and
24. In some cases the non-industrialized states have nevertheless recognized the necessity
of getting the powerful states on their side. A good example of this occurred during the
negotiation of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. See Hugo
Caminos & Michael R. Molitor, Progressive Development of International Law and the
Package Deal, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 871-82 (1985).
.25. See, e.g., OBED Y. ASAMOAH, THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DECLARATIONS OF
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS 46-62 (1966); JORGE CASTANEDA, LEGAL
EFFECTS OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 168-77 (Alba Amoia trans., 1969); ROSALYN
HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF
THE UNITED NATIONS 6-7 (1963); Eduardo Jimdnez de Ardchaga, International Law in the
Past Third of a Century, 159 R.C.A.D.I. 1, 30-34 (1978-I); Military and Paramilitary Activi-
ties in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 1, 4, at IN 183-90 (June 27)
[hereinafter Nicaragua Case]. For a paper which goes further and considers the behavior of
non-governmental organizations relevant to the process of customary international law, see
Isabelle R. Gunning, Modernizing Customary International Law: The Challenge of Human
Rights, 31 VA. J. INT'L. L. 211 (1991).
26. A debate on this issue took place in the Sixth Committee of the United Nations
General Assembly in 1974. Review of the Role of the International Court of Justice, U.N.
GAOR 6th Comm., 29th Sess., 1470th mtg., Agenda Item 93 at 38, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1470
(1974) (Mexico); 1486th mtg. Agenda Item 93 at 133-4, U.N. Doc. AIC.6/SR.1486 (1974)
(Netherlands & Mexico); 1492d mtg., Agenda Item 93 at 166-70, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1492
(1974) (various states). See also D'Amato, Trashing Customary International Law, supra note
20; Stephen M. Schwebel, United Nations Resolutions, Recent Arbitral Awards and Custom-
ary International Law, in REALISM IN LAW-MAKING: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF WILLIAM
RjPHAGEN 203 (Adriaan Bos & Hugo Siblesz eds., 1986); I. Seidl-Hohenveldem, Internation-
al Economic Law, 198 R.C.A.D.I. 9, 68 (1986-Ill); Prosper Weil, Towards Relative
Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 413, 417 (1983). For a particularly
strong, recent expression of this view from a Polish author, see K. Wolfke, Some Persistent
Controversies Regarding Customary International Law, 24 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 3-4
(1993).
27. This is the position adopted here. See discussion infra part III.B; accord Pellet, supra
note 13, at 44; Guy LADREIT DE LACHARRItRE, LA POLITIQUE JURIDIQUE EXTIRIEURE DE LA
[Vol. 17:109
Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules
scholars, despite their refusal to frame the debate about resolutions and
declarations in these terms, are disputing the role of power in the forma-
tion of customary international law.
B. Power and the Scope of International Human Rights
The role of power in the process of customary international law is
also an important, albeit not explicit, element of the debate about the
extent to which international huinan fights law can pierce the territorial
jurisdictions of non-consenting states.2" It is generally accepted that the
rules and procedures articulated in human rights treaties apply, as treaty
obligations, only to states which have ratified those treaties. Yet many
scholars have insisted that even those states which have refused to ratify
human rights treaties have international human rights obligations. They
have based this insistence on two main grounds. First, by ratifying the
U.N. Charter, all member states accepted the general human rights
obligations set out in Articles 55(c) and 56.29 This argument asserts that
the subsequent human rights treaties have simply elaborated the Charter-
FRANCE 55-58 (1983). For a suggestion of support see 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW
31 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992). For an attempt to remove the debate
- as it relates to human rights - from the area of customary international law and place it
under the rubric of general principles of international law, see Bruno Simma & Philip Alston,
The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUSTL.
Y.B. INT'L L. 82 (1992). It is interesting that this debate has focused on those organizations
which operate on the basis of one state-one vote, and not on other organizations, such as the
World Bank and International Monetary Fund, which operate on the basis of weighted voting
systems. The one state-one vote system is itself an important qualifier on traditional forms of
power, in that it has given less powerful states a better means of expression,. and raised the
possibility that this expression, itself a new source of power, could have law-creating effects.
28. The traditional position is exemplified by the U.N. Charter: "Nothing contained in
the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require the Members to
submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter .... " U.N. CHARTER art. 2(7).
See also Ian Brownlie, The Relation of Law and Power, in CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER ON HIS EIGHTIETH
BIRTHDAY 19, 21 (Bin Cheng & E.D. Brown eds., 1988).
29. Article 55 states:
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are
necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations
shall promote:
(c) universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental free-
doms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. ...
U.N. CHARTER art. 55(c). Article 56 states that "[a]ll Members pledge themselves to take joint
and separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes
set forth in Article 55." U.N. CHARTER art. 56.
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based obligations, not created new obligations in themselves.3" Second,
scholars have asserted that rules of customary international law have
developed with respect to the content of specific human rights and the
jurisdiction of the international community to monitor, encourage re-
spect for and even enforce the implementation of those rights within the
territory of non-consenting states.3'
Many states and some scholars have disagreed strongly with the
above propositions. 32 The objections of many non-industrialized states to
the "cultural imperialism" of the international human rights movement
and continued stonewalling by states such as China, Indonesia and Iran
stand in stark contrast to the language of instruments such as the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights and the claims of most scholars
working in the field.
In practice, international organizations have settled on a compro-
mise. This middle ground accepts the development of some human
rights as rules of customary international law but limits the international
community to a "droit de regard": a right to monitor and encourage
from the outside the protection of those rights within non-consenting
states.33 This compromise does not allow individual states, groups of
states or international organizations to intervene directly in the internal
affairs of non-consenting states. 34
Humanitarian intervention is the only significant area of interna-
tional law in which this compromise might be breaking down. However,
state practice in support of a right of humanitarian intervention is mini-
mal, especially when compared to decades of nonintervention on human-
30. See, e.g., THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS
CUSTOMARY LAW 81-85 (1989); Jean-Franqois Bonin, La protection contre la torture et les
traitements cruels, inhumains et digradants: l'affirmation d'une norme et l'volution d'une
definition en droit international, 3 REVUE QUABnCOISE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL [R.Q.D.I.]
169, 171-73 (1986); Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of
Individuals Rather Than States, 32 AM. U. L. REv. 1, 13-17 (1982).
31. See generally MERON, supra note 30, at 79-135; Simma & Alston, supra note 27, at
84-96 (reviewing various positions).
32. See, e.g., Eric Lane, Demanding Human Rights: A Change in the World Legal Order,
6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 269, 279-86 (1978); J.S. Watson, Autointerpretation, Competence, and
the Continuing Validity of Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 60, 71-77
(1977); Arthur M. Weisburd, Customary International Law: The Problem of Treaties, 21
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 39-41 (1988). This article does not deal with the first of these
propositions. However, it should be noted that the language of Articles 55 and 56 is language
of promotion, and not of enforcement or protection.
33. See Simma & Alston, supra note 27, at 98-99.
34. This compromise is not absolutely clear-cut. For instance, many states consider that
the provision, by other states or international organizations, of financial support to opposition
groups constitutes intervention in their internal affairs. Nevertheless, such support is some-
times openly provided.
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itarian grounds. Moreover, recent humanitarian interventions have been
conducted under the aegis of Chapter VII of the Charter. This meant
that situations such as those in northern Iraq, Somalia, Haiti and Rwan-
da had to be classified, somewhat tenuously, as threats to "international
peace and security" and that the "right" to intervene did not need to
exist as a right under customary international law.35
This human rights debate is clearly about the role of power in the
process of customary international law, although it is rarely framed in
those terms. At the most basic level, it is a debate about the continuing
validity of the traditional view that states have the exclusive right to
govern matters occurring within their own borders and not affecting
other states, in light of increasing efforts to challenge that exclusivity
with customary rules.
C. Power and the Transforming Effects of Legal Systems
It is clear from the preceding discussion that power is derived from
a number of different sources. First, power derived from military capa-
bilities provides states with the option of using force to impose their
will, or resist the efforts of others to do so. Second, power derived from
wealth provides states with the capability to impose and withstand trade
sanctions, to grant Most Favored Nation status or not to care whether it
is granted. Power derived from wealth also enables states to support an
effective diplomatic corps which can monitor international developments
and apply pressure, based on all the various sources of power, in politi-
cal organizations such as the United Nations. Third, power is derived
from moral authority: the ability to appeal to general principles of
justice. In the human rights field, for instance, the existence of a high
35. The existence of large numbers of refugees in these situations provided the strongest
ground on which a threat to international peace and security could have been established.
However, refugee flows received little attention in the relevant debates of the Security
Council. As for the status of humanitarian intervention outside the scope of Chapter VII,
many recent scholarly contributions on the subject have not even considered its legality under
customary international law. See, e.g., Ruth Gordon, United Nations Intervention in Internal
Conflicts: Iraq, Somalia, and Beyond, 15 MicH. J. INT'L L. 519.(1994); Mark R. Hutchinson,
Restoring Hope: U.N. Security Council Resolutions for Somalia and an Expanded Doctrine of
Humanitarian Intervention, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 624 (1993); David M. Kresock, "Ethnic
Cleansing" in the Balkans: The Legal Foundation of Foreign Intervention, 27 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 203 (1994); Donatella Luca, Intervention humanitaire: questions et reflexions, 5 INT'L J.
REFUGEE L. 424 (1993). But see Christopher Greenwood, Is there a right of humanitarian
intervention?, 49 WORLD TODAY 34 (1993); Richard B. Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention
through the United Nations: Towards the Development of Criteria, 53 ZEITSC-RIFT FOR
AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VbLKENRECHT [Z.a.6.R.V.] 557 (1993); Anthony
C. Ofodile, The Legality of ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
381 (1994).
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degree of moral authority in support of some customary rules has dis-
couraged states which might otherwise have opposed those rules from
doing so, from openly violating those rules, or from admitting to con-
cealed violations of them.36 These different sources of power are impor-
tant in terms of the process of customary international law because their
cumulative effect determines whether and to what degree different states
are able to engage in behavior which contributes to the maintenance,
development, and change of.customary rules.
Less noticeable but equally important are the legitimizing and
constraining effects that the international legal system has on applica-
tions of state power. States pursue their self-interest in many different
ways. On occasion they may apply raw, unsystematized power in the
pursuit of a short-term goal. However, the application of raw power
promotes instability and escalation, and is not particularly subtle or
efficient. More frequently, states will apply power within the framework
of an institution or legal system. States develop and utilize institutions
and legal systems because they create expectations of behavior, which
lessens the risk of escalation and facilitates efficiency of action, and
because they promote stability, thus protecting states which recognize
that they could find themselves on the opposite side of an issue in future
situations.37
However, a legal system such as the international legal system does
more than simply create expectations and promote stability. It also
fulfills an essentially social function by transforming applications of raw
power into legitimate power, thereby creating rights to apply power
within certain structures using certain means. For instance, in the ab-
sence of an overarching, law-making sovereign, the international legal
system demands reciprocity: recognition on the part of those applying
power of the rights of others to apply power within those same struc-
tures and using those same means. This recognition in turn imposes
significant constraints on states as they engage in behavior that contrib-
utes to the maintenance, development, or change of rules of customary
36. The prohibition against torture is probably the best example of such a rule. See
NIGEL S. RODLEY, THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 63-64
(1987). Moral authority would also seem to have played an important role in the entire
process of decolonization. For a philosophical examination of this source of power, see
generally Friedrich Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, reprinted in 13 'THE COMPLETE
WORKS OF FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE (Oscar Levy ed., 1913).
37. This latter insight is generally attributed to John Rawls. See RAWLS, supra note 10,
at 235-43. The creation of institutions and legal systems by states is thus motivated by long-
term calculations of self-interest. On the creation of institutions, see generally KEOHANE, The
Demand for International Regimes, supra note 6; YOUNG, supra note 2, at 1-6. For further
discussion of the benefits offered by institutions, see infra pp. 166-67.
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international law.38 By qualifying and constraining the application of
state power in the customary process in this and other ways,39 the inter-
national legal system distinguishes the resulting rules of customary
international law from the arbitrary commands of powerful states, and
accords those rules the authority and compelling power of the entire
international society of which that legal system is a part.40
By applying power in the process of customary international law,
states thus create generalized rules which both protect and constrain
established sources, and further applications, of power in an ever-chang-
ing world. The debates about resolutions and declarations as state prac-
tice and the scope of international human rights are therefore also de-
bates about the structure of the international legal system, about the
ways in which that system has legitimized the application of certain
forms of power, and whether it should continue to do so.
This explanation of the legitimizing and constraining effects of the
international legal system also represents the crucial difference between
the approach adopted by this article and that adopted by the "New
Haven School." According to Harold Lasswell, Myres McDougal and
their "associates," power finds expression in and is to some degree
38. For a discussion of the effects of the principle of reciprocity, see infra part VI.
39. See infra parts IV-VII.
40. On the role of legal systems in legitimizing power so as to create law, see ALLOTT,
supra note 5, at 133-66; 1 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 31-36 (Guenther Roth &
Claus Wittich eds., 1968); MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 3-9 (Max
Rheinstein & Edward Shils trans., 1954). Weber's use of "legitimacy," which, despite its
emphasis on commands and office, is concerned with the effects of legal processes on the
creation of rules, may be contrasted with that made by Thomas Franck. See THOMAS M.
FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990).
Franck's concept of legitimacy is broader than Weber's; in addition to the processes of
rule creation, legitimacy is derived from factors, such as internal coherence, which are
inherent in rules themselves, and factors, such as ritual and pedigree, which are associated
with but not an intrinsic part either of rules or the processes of rule creation. When Franck
discussed rule creation he did so using modified versions of H.L.A. Hart's concepts of
secondary rules and rule(s) of recognition. According to Franck, "[a] rule has greater legiti-
macy if it is validated by having been made in accordance with secondary rules about rule-
making." FRANCK, supra, at 193 (emphasis added). In addition, "there is widespread accep-
tance by states of the notion that time-and-practice-honored-conduct - pedigreed custom -
has the capacity to bind states...I." d. at 189. This "rule of recognition" is part of a larger,
"ultimate rule of recognition," id., which in turn is but one of several ultimate rules. These
rules, which are "irreducible prerequisites for an international concept of right process," id. at
194 (emphasis omitted), and not derived from any legal process, are the sole source of
legitimacy within the process whereby particular, primary rules are created.
This article, while agreeing that legitimacy may flow from many sources, adopts
Weber's approach to legitimacy and focuses on the legitimizing effects of the customary
process as sich. This view is consistent with this article's assertion, infra part III.D., that
even the fundamental principles which structure the international legal system are derived
from the customary process, and are therefore not external to it.
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derived from the authority and control exercised by decision-makers.4'
This exercise of authority and control through the decision-making
process gives rise to law or, in the case of customary international law,
to behavior which creates law.42 However, although decisions ideally
should consider values in pursuit of common interests or goals, the legal
system itself places no restrictions and has no qualifying effects on this
process.43
In contrast, this article focuses on. how the international legal sys-
tem, and more specifically the customary process and certain funda-
mental, structural principles of international law, accord or withhold
legitimacy from the results of decision-making processes, namely ap-
plications of state power. Thus, the application of authority and control
is qualified in a manner which resembles the value-inspired process
described and systematized by the New Haven School. At the same
time, it is more institutionalized and internationalized, and therefore less
prone to state-specific subjectivity. In short, the New Haven School
seeks to define how individual decision-makers should consciously
engage in making laws which further the "common interest." As will be
explained later in this article, the customary process and certain funda-
mental, structural principles of international law already fulfill this
function, determining common interests in a more objective manner than
an individual decision-maker, before protecting and promoting those
interests with law. 44
D. Power and Critical Legal Scholarship
In recent years the important role played by power in the interna-
tional legal system has been exposed to some degree by Critical Legal
41. For a concise, readily comprehensible explanation of the New Haven School ap-
proach, see W. Michael Reisman, The View from the New Haven School of International Law,
86 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 118 (1992).
42. See Raman, Toward a General Theory, supra note 21; and K. Venkata Raman, Pre-
scription of International Law by Customary Practice (1967) (unpublished S.J.D. thesis, Yale
Law School).
43. The values, as defined by the New Haven School, are power, entitlement, wealth,
skill, well-being, affection, respect and rectitude. The most important of the common interests
or goals is the furtherance of "human dignity." For applications of this approach to specific
areas of international law, see generally MYRES S. McDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO,
LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
COERCION (1961); MYRES S. McDOUGAL & WILLIAM T. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE
OCEANS: A CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA (1962); MYRES S. MCDoUGAL
ET AL., THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: PRINCIPLES OF
CONTENT AND PROCEDURE (1967); MYRES S. McDoUGAL ET AL., LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER
IN SPACE (1963).
44. For further discussion of the relationship between the ideas espoused by this article
and the New Haven School, see infra note 98.
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Studies scholars, which may explain, in part, the disquiet which many
international lawyers feel with respect to the work of jurists such as
David Kennedy and Martti Koskenniemi. 45 The goal of these scholars,
like their counterparts working within national legal systems, is to
expose the myths of objectivity, value freedom, and determinacy in law
and law creation by deconstructing legal texts, thus demonstrating that
legal systems are neither self-contained nor politically neutral. Instead,
those systems are based on tensions inherent in liberal ideology be-
tween, for example, the community and the individual or positivism and
naturalism.
46
Unfortunately, those Critical Legal Studies scholars working in
international law have themselves only just begun to explore the non-
legal factors which must be responsible for the inconsistencies they
criticize. Koskenniemi, for instance, has suggested that customary in-
ternational law in the human rights field is determined not by formal
tests of legal validity, but by "an anterior - though at least in some
respects largely shared - criterion of what is right and good for human
life."47 According to Koskenniemi, shared values and differing degrees
of political conviction about the value of particular norms - rather than
a legal process as such - account for the existence of, and hierarchy'
among, the various international human rights.48 However, this examina-
45. The two most important works are: DAVID KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
STRUCTURES (1987) and MARTrI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA (1989). See also
Anthony Carty, Critical International Law: Recent Trends in the Theory of International Law,
2 EUR. J. INT'L L. 66 (1991) (summarizing and critiquing Kennedy and Koskenniemi's
books). But see David J. Bederman, Stalking Phaedrus, 18 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 527
(1988) (reviewing DAVID KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STRUCTURES (1987)); Phillip R.
Trimble, International Law, World Order, and Critical Legal Studies, 42 STANFORD L. REV.
811, 822-32 (1990) (reviewing DAVID KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STRUCTURES
(1987)).
46. It is important to note that those Critical Legal Studies scholars who have focused on
national legal systems have had a second project, namely, designing alternative modes of
discourse, resource distribution and conflict resolution. See, e.g., HUGH COLLINS, THE LAW
OF CONTRACT (2d ed. 1993); ROBERTO M. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVE-
MENT (1986); David Jabbari, From Criticism to Construction in Modern Critical Legal
Theory, 12 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 507 (1992). Koskenniemi, at the end of his book, has
offered a tentative and rather amorphous agenda for reconstructing the international legal
order which he has just attempted to take apart; an agenda based on free-ranging communica-
tion, imaginative context-transformation and deeply-felt. notions of justice. KOSKENNIEMI,
supra note 45, at 458-501.
47. Martti Koskenniemi, The Pull of the Mainstream, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1946, 1953
(1990) (book review). With respect to non-human rights rules he has reaffirmed the dominant
role of politics and power. See, e.g., Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law,
1 EUR. J. INT'L L. 4, 7 (1990). This is why, in response to theories attempting to explain the
sources of international human rights, he has cautioned against "the pull of the mainstream."
48. For an explanation of how Koskenniemi's suggestion might accord with the theory of
customary international law advanced in this article, see infra part III.C.
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tion of non-legal factors has remained peripheral to Koskenniemi's
larger project of exposing inconsistencies in international law.49
Scholars from the non-industrialized world have long recognized the
importance of power and inequality in the international legal system.
They have argued that the system, including its rule-making processes,
was created by industrialized states to serve their own interests and not
the interests of newer, less powerful states.' Their perspective on the
role of power helps explain their position with respect to the issue of
whether resolutions and declarations may constitute state practice in the
process of customary international law.5'
More recently, feminist legal scholars have hypothesized that the
international legal system is dominated by male power.52 Many aca-
demics are uncomfortable with this proposition,53 and it is possible that
their discomfort is accentuated by the fact that some feminist legal
scholars are also beginning to explore the limits of the concept of state
equality in international law.54 Yet, as with the Critical Legal Studies
scholars, feminist scholars and scholars from the non-industrialized
world have only exposed the importance of power; they have yet to
explain how power operates within the international legal system to
create law.
The failure of international legal scholars to examine rigorously the
important role played by power in the customary process is perhaps
understandable in that any international lawyer who does so risks seeing
customary international law rendered largely redundant, as strictly an
49. Kennedy, for his part, stated emphatically that: "I do not analyze the relationship
between international legal materials and their political and interpretive milieu. I am not
concerned about the context within which arguments are made and doctrines developed."
KENNEDY, supra note 45, at 7. It should also be noted that Koskenniemi's, albeit tentative,
examination of non-legal factors has followed the direction already taken by some of his
national law counterparts. See, e.g., THE POLITICS OF LAW (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990).
50. See, e.g., MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI, TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER (1979);
Edward Kwakwa, Emerging International Development Law and Traditional International
Law - Congruence or Cleavage?, 17 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 431 (1987); K.B. Lall,
Economic Inequality and International Law, 14 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 7 (1974).
51. See discussion supra part I.A.
52. See, e.g., Hilary Charlesworth, The Public/Private Distinction and the Right to
Development in International Law, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 190 (1992); Hilary Charlesworth
et al., Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 613 (1991); Christine
Chinkin, A Gendered Perspective to the International Use of Force, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L.
279 (1992); Shelley Wright, Economic Rights and Social Justice: A Feminist Analysis of
Some International Human Rights Conventions, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 241 (1992); Wright,
A Feminist Reappraisal, supra note 7.
53. See, e.g., Fernando R. T6son, Feminism and International Law: A Reply, 33 VA. J.
INT'L L. 647 (1993).
54. See, e.g., Wright, A Feminist Reappraisal, supra note 7.
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effect of what states do rather than as a factor which affects how they
behave. In short, individual customary rules would be subject to change
as a result of any modification in the power relationships among states.
This risk is even larger in scope than it may at first seem, since
most of the fundamental principles which structure the international
legal system, including-the treaty-making process, are themselves cus-
tomary in origin. International law as a whole would therefore be ren-
dered inherently unstable and lacking in any sustained, determinant
effect. International lawyers, in turn, would become as peripheral to
international society as international law. They would be nothing more
than participants in an illusion, where practitioners cite nominally objec-
tive, stable, and determinable rules while ignoring the impossibility of
objectivity, stability and determinacy."
II. LAW, POWER, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
During the 1930s and 1940s a split developed in Anglo-American
international law, with scholars such as E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau
rejecting what they perceived as the misplaced idealism of "Wilsonian"
legal-moralism in favor of power-oriented "realism." These scholars
were soon identified as belonging to a new academic discipline called
international relations. As realists, these. early international relations
scholars had little interest in law; from their perspective, states were
merely self-interested actors engaged in a ruthless struggle for power.
5 6
It later became apparent to a few international relations scholars that
law was, in one way or another, still a part of international society and
thus something which they needed to incorporate into their realist under-
standings of international relations. Stanley Hoffmann, Morton Kaplan
and Nicholas Katzenbach, for instance, attempted to explain the exis-
tence of international law on the basis of systems theory.5 ' For these
55. This, indeed, is Koskenniemi's main point. See KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 45, at
476-83; see also Philip Allott, Language, Method and the Nature of International Law, 45
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 79 (1971).
56. See, e.g., CARR, supra note 6, at 170-207; MORGENTHAU, supra note 4, at 275-311.
It is important to note that a similar idealist/realist split had already occurred elsewhere. In
Germany the debate about the "Rechtsnatur des V61kerrechts" may be traced back at least as
far as Hegel. See G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT I 330-40 (T.M.
Knox trans., 1967). For an historical overview see GEORG DAHM, VOLKERRECHT 7-14 (1958).
Scholars from the United States have dominated the debate in the second half of the twentieth
century, although linkages with the earlier debate in Germany - one being through
Morgenthau - are apparent.
57. See MORTON A. KAPLAN & NICHOLAS DE B. KATZENBACH, THE POLITICAL FOUN-
DATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1961); Stanley Hoffmann, International Systems and
International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 89 (Richard A. Falk &
Wolfram F. Hanrieder eds., 1968).
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systems theorists, law was a part as well as a product of any political
system seeking to regulate itself. However, in their evaluation, the
international system, unlike national systems, had not established suffi-
cient consensus to permit the creation of truly independent, binding
rules. States, in short, were not prepared to allow international law to
play an autonomous role.5 Consequently, although international law
existed, it was entirely dependent on the fluctuating power relationships
among states.
Structural realism, largely associated with the work of Kenneth
Waltz, also sought to explain international relations in a systemic man-
ner. Yet structural realists considered systems theory to be unsatisfactory
because it involved the regulation of actors through systems which those
actors themselves created. Structural realists favored what was in effect
a new systems theory which focused on the larger system, or structure,
within which actors operate. For Waltz, this larger structure included an
ordering principle, the specification of functions of differentiated units,
and the distribution of capabilities across those units. 9 Although it is
conceivable that Waltz could have included international law among
those structural elements which determine how actors in the internation-
al system interact, he argued instead that unequal states engage each
other in a system, the defining structural aspect of which is anarchy.
60
Waltz's rejection of international law as a structural element might
be regarded as a decisive step away from a possible reconciliation
between the disciplines of international relations and international law.6'
However, the idea of structural or systemic controls on the exercise of
unequal power left open the possibility of incorporating international
law into a more sophisticated realist conception of international rela-
tions.
Regime theorists have seized this possibility, taking Waltz's idea of
structural control and developing it in terms of the structural charac-
teristics of "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and
decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge
in a given area of international relations., 62 Regime theorists, in short,
58. See, e.g., Stanley Hoffmann, International Law and the Control of Force, in THE
RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 5, at 21; KAPLAN & KATZENBACH, supra
note 57, at 350.
59. See WALTZ, supra note 4, at 88-101.
60. Id. at 102-28. Waltz used "anarchy" in the Greek sense of the word, to refer to the
absence of an overarching sovereign.
61. See, e.g., Burley, supra note 2, at 217 ("[Waltz] left no room whatsoever for interna-
tional law.").
62. The definition is taken from Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime
Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1, 2 (Stephen
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are international relations scholars who have recognized the difficulties
involved in attempting to explain all relations among states solely on the
basis of relative power and short-term calculations of self-interest.
Instead, they suggest that sets of rules or procedures developed by and
between states may acquire a life of their own, controlling, or at least
qualifying, the day-to-day application of power by those and other
states. To an international lawyer this phenomenon sounds like interna-
tional law by another name. Indeed, it is international law, with the
important twist that regime theorists, unlike international lawyers, are
directly concerned about the relationship between power and sets of
rules or procedures.63
Regime theorists, like most political scientists, are operating at a
different level of analysis from most legal scholars. Political scientists
are interested in how groups of human beings organize themselves and
interact with one another. In the national sphere, they examine the
political processes which, among other things, give rise to legal rules.
Most legal academics, on the other hand, are concerned with determin-
ing the existence, meaning, scope of application and effect of legal
rules, and not so much with understanding the processes through which
those rules are created.
Although it is relatively easy to make a distinction between the
study of lawmaking and the determination of rules when dealing with
legislatively-enacted or executively-decreed law, the linkages between
these activities are much more evident in judge-made or custom-based
legal systems. The law in these systems is constantly evolving as the
relevant actors, be they judges, states, or ordinary individuals, continu-
ally engage in legally relevant behavior.' As a result, change in these
D. Krasner ed., 1983). This article's interpretation of the relationship between structural
realism and regime theory would thus appear to differ from that initially put forward by
Slaughter Burley. However, Slaughter Burley later acknowledged the connection between
structural realism and regime theory, referring to regime theory at one point as "modified
Structural Realism." Burley, supra note 2, at 221; see also id. at 219; YOUNG, supra note 2,
at 92 n.41; ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World
Politics, in INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND STATE POWER, supra note 6, at 1, 7-8
[hereinafter KEOHANE, Neoliberal Institutionalism].
63. International relations scholars have yet to study relationships between different
regimes, focusing instead on relationships between particular regimes and states. This article
does likewise, although the relationship between the process of customary international law
and other international institutions, and in particular how the subsequent development or
change of customary rules affects pre-existing treaties, deserves attention. See, in this context,
the work of the Institut de droit international on Problems arising from a succession of
codification conventions on a particular subject, 66 ANNUAIRE (Institut de Droit international)
13, 195-208 (1995).
64. They are, in this sense, both creators and subjects of the law. On this "d&loublement
fonctionnel" see GEORGES SCELLE, PRtCIS DE DROIT DES GENS, DEUXItME PARTIE: DROIT
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systems is often incremental, whereas legislatively-enacted or exec-
utively-decreed law tends to change less often, and when it does change,
it does so more abruptly. It is therefore difficult to study the rules of a
judge-made or custom-based legal system without devoting considerable
time and thought to the manner in which the system operates.65 The
rules are part of the system, the system is a process, and the questions
of which rules exist and how those rules are made necessarily coalesce.
For this reason, and since no overarching sovereign exists in the interna-
tional system, an interdisciplinary approach to the study of customary
international law is called for.66
To a regime theorist, power and the rules and procedures which
result from patterns of interdependence "are closely related - indeed,
two sides of a single coin."'67 This is because interdependence is often
asymmetrical; despite their dependence on each other some states remain
more powerful, and therefore less dependent than others. 68 Since interde-
pendence is both the reason for, and the result of, regimes, those struc-
tures necessarily reflect the frequently asymmetrical nature of inter-state
power relationships.69
CONSTITUTIONNEL INTERNATIONAL 10-12 (1934). On customary legal systems other than
customary international law see, e.g., JOHN L. COMAROFF & SIMON ROBERTS, RULES AND
PROCESSES: THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF DISPUTE IN AN AFRICAN CONTEXT (1981); JOHN P.
REID, LAW FOR THE ELEPHANT: PROPERTY AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR ON THE OVERLAND TRAIL
(1980); Michael Reisman, Looking, Staring and Glaring: Microlegal Systems and Public
Order, 12 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 165 (1983); Walter 0. Weyrauch & Maureen A. Bell,
Autonomous Lawmaking: The Case of.the 'Gypsies', 103 YALE L.J. 323 (1993).
65. Nevertheless, many people operating within judge-made legal systems do seem to
operate strictly on the basis of "black-letter law." This focus is not possible in custom-based
systems unless periodic and authoritative determinations of the state of customary law with
respect to specific questions are readily available. It is possible that the high degree of
authority the international community accords to previous decisions of the International Court
of Justice in subsequent disputes thus represents an attempt to find determinacy through rules
without becoming submerged in trying to understand the customary process. See A.W.B.
Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 77
(A.W.B. Simpson ed., 2d ed. 1973).
66. See discussion supra part I.C.
67. Robert 0. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power and Interdependence Revisited, 41
INT'L ORG. 725, 730 (1987).
68. See generally ROBERT 0. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPEN-
DENCE 10-11 (1977); see also Keohane & Nye, Power and Interdependence Revisited, supra
note 67, at 728, and citations therein.
69. According to the regime theorists, it is because states seeking to further their self-
interest recognize the benefits of cooperation that they create sets of rules and procedures.
Realist premises are thus central to the entire project of regime theory. See ROBERT 0.
KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY (1984); KEOHANE, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND STATE
POWER, supra note 6. See also discussion supra note 6 and accompanying text. Presumably,
a higher degree of interdependence between states or within groups of states will result in
those states having an interest in a greater number and scope of transnational structures. See,
in this context, the writings of "liberal" theorists of international law, such as Burley, supra
note 2.
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Regime theorists have not written much about informal rules and
procedures, although some of them have recognized that regimes "may
be more or less formally articulated, and ... may or may not be ac-
companied by explicit organizations."70 Instead, they have focused on
multilateral treaties and international organizations, around or within
which informal rules and procedures may develop, but if they do de-
velop, fulfill only a supplementary role. Regimes, according to regime
theorists, operate in "issue areas" such as environmental protection,
telecommunications, human rights, and the law of the sea. 71 And the
majority of regime theorists have concentrated their attention on issue
areas of a commercial nature, such as trade, monetary management and
technology transfer.72
70. See, e.g., YOUNG, supra note 2, at 13. Young wrote:
Some writers have fallen into the habit of equating regimes with the agreements in
terms of which the regimes are often expressed or codified. In practice, however,
international regimes vary greatly in the extent to which they are expressed in
formal agreements, treaties, or conventions.... As in domestic society, moreover,
it is common for informal understandings to arise within the framework established
by the formal structure of an international regime. Such understandings may serve
either to provide interpretations of ambiguous aspects of the formal arrangements
... or to supplement formal arrangements by dealing with issues they fail to
cover .... Though it may be helpful, formalization is clearly not a necessary
condition for the effective operation of international regimes. There are informal
regimes that have been generally successful, and there are formal arrangements that
have produced unimpressive results ....
Id. at 24 (footnotes omitted). However, Young gave no example of an informal regime which
has been "generally successful." See also id. at 15 n.11, 214.
71. Young has written: "International regimes ... are ... specialized arrangements that
pertain to well-defined activities, resources, or geographical areas and often involve only
some subset of the members of international society." YOUNG, supra note 2, at 13. Specific
regimes, and the issue areas they regulate, are often "nested" in larger and more general
regimes which address larger and more general issue areas. Consequently, regimes build on,
and.rarely conflict with one another. Id. at 14; see also ORAN YOUNG, RESOURCE MANAGE-
MENT AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL (1977); Peter F. Cowhey, The International Telecom-
munications Regime: The Political Roots of Regimes for High Technology, 44 INT'L ORG. 169
(1990); Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis, 40 INT'L ORG. 599
(1986); Ernst B. Haas, Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes, 32
WORLD POLITICS 357 (1980); Peter M. Haas, Epistemic Communities and the Dynamics of
International Environmental Co-operation, in REGIME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELA-
TIONS, supra note 4, at 168; Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty, Regimes, and Human Rights, in
REGIME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 4, at. 139; Robert E. Money,
Jr., The Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty: Maintaining a Legal
Regime, 7 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 163 (1993).
72. This focus is perhaps partly due to Keohane's use of a market-forces analogy to
explain the "demand" for international regimes. See KEOHANE, The Demandfor International
Regimes, supra note 6; see also VINOD K. AGGARWAL, LIBERAL PROTECTIONISM: THE
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF ORGANIZED TEXTILE TRADE (1985); .Richard N. Cooper,
Prolegomena to the Choice of an International Monetary System, 29 INT'L ORG. 63 (1975);
Jock A. Finlayson & Mark W. Zacher, The GATT and the Regulation of Trade Barriers:
Regime Dynamics and Functions, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, supra note 62, at 273; Ernst
Haas, supra note 71.
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Regime theory has recently developed into an area of international
relations thought referred to as institutionalism.73 Its two leading pro-
ponents have been Robert Keohane and Oran Young, although the ideas
of these two scholars have differed in important ways. For Keohane, the
concept of institutions was far larger in scope than that of regimes. It
included all "persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and infor-
mal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity and shape expec-
tations. 74
Keohane divided institutions into three groups on the basis of their
differing degrees of organization or formality. First, there are "formal
intergovernmental or cross-national nongovernmental organizations."
Second, there are international regimes, which Keohane defined as
"institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon by governments, that
pertain to particular sets of issues in international relations." Regimes
are, in short, "specific contractual solutions." Finally, there are conven-
tions, which Keohane defined as "informal institutions, with implicit
",75rules and understandings, that shape the expectations of actors.
Keohane elaborated somewhat on his idea of conventions, stating
that they "enable actors to understand one another and, without explicit
rules, to coordinate their behavior" and that they "are especially appro-
priate for situations ... where it is to everyone's interest to behave in a
particular way as long as others also do so." States conform to con-
ventions because "non-conformity to the expectations of others entails
costs." Keohane provided two examples of conventions: first,
"[t]raditional diplomatic immunity" before it was codified in the 1961
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the 1963 Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations and, second, reciprocity.76
73. It is again worth noting that continental European scholars have already covered
much of this ground. For what can only be described as early institutionalist thought, see THE
FRENCH INSTITUTIONALISTS (Albert Broderick ed. & Mary Welling trans., 1970) (translating
and analyzing the works of Maurice Hauriou, Georges Renard and Joseph Delos); CARL
SCHMITT, OBER DIE DREI ARTEN DES RECHTSWISSENSCHAFrLICHEN DENKENS (1934). See also
SCELLE, supra note 64 (regarding international law).
74. KEOHANE, Neoliberal Institutionalism, supra note 62, at 3.
75. Id. at 3-4.
76. Id. at 4. Keohane explained reciprocity as involving "exchanges of roughly equiva-
lent values in which the actions of each party are contingent on the prior actions of the others
in such a way that good is returned for good, and bad for bad." Robert 0. Keohane, Reci-
procity in International Relations, 40 INT'L ORG. 1, 8 (1986). He distinguished between
"specific reciprocity," where two parties "exchange items of equivalent value in a strictly
delimited sequence," id. at 4, and "diffuse reciprocity," where exchanges occur within a group
of parties, with the cooperative behavior of one party frequently being rewarded in another
situation, at some other time, by a party which did not benefit directly from that first specific
instance of cooperative behavior. Id. at 4, 20.
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Keohane's definition of conventions is similar to, and would seem
to encompass, the process of customary international law. Like many
customary rules, Keohane's conventions are "temporally and logically
prior to regimes or formal international organizations" and "[i]n the
absence of conventions, it would be difficult for states to negotiate with
one another or even to understand the meaning of each other's ac-
tions. Unlike customary rules, however, Keohane's conventions do
not appear to be legally binding. 78 Conventions, like regimes and orga-
nizations, are voluntary constructs of states. However, unlike the explicit
rules involved in regimes and organizations, conventions are not "con-
tractual" in nature. Therefore, non-conformity with conventions merely
imposes efficiency costs and does not constitute a breach of legal obli-
gations.
The concept of international law held by Keohane is itself unstable
and indeterminate since the unequal application of state power is not
substantially checked by the existence of legal obligations. Although
Keohane's institutions "affect the incentives facing states, even if those
states' fundamental interests are defined autonomously, ' 79 they are
defined by power-maximizing states and subject to redefinition at their
Keohane's concept of diffuse reciprocity was an advance on previous discussions of
reciprocity by international relations scholars, where it was assumed that the degree of trust or
obligation necessary to support such non-specific exchanges does not exist between states.
See, e.g., ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 3-20 (1984). However,
although Keohane based his explanation of diffuse reciprocity on "a widespread sense of
obligation" among the members of a group, he did not consider the connections between
obligation, reciprocity, and law. Keohane, Reciprocity in International Relations, supra, at 20.
The furthest he went was to state that "actors recognize that a 'veil of ignorance' separates
them from the future but nevertheless offer benefits to others on the assumption that these
will redound to their own advantage in the end." Id. at 23. This article goes much further and
considers reciprocity, in addition to being a general social concept which recognizes the
benefits of specific and diffuse cooperation, as a fundamental, structural principle of interna-
tional law which plays an important role in qualifying the application of state power in the
maintenance, development, and change of customary rules. See discussion infra part VI.
77. KEOHANE, Neoliberal Institutionalism, supra note 62, at 4.
78. Keohane seemed to believe that these (informal) conventions are not part of interna-
tional law. He has emphasized the formal nature of international law, writing (here using the
word conventions in a different sense, to refer to multilateral treaties) that "all formal
international regimes are parts of international law, as are formal bilateral treaties and
conventions." ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, International Institutions: Two Approaches, in INTERNA-
TIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND STATE POWER, supra note 6, at 158, 163; see also discussion of
Keohane's understanding of reciprocity, supra note 76. However, Keohane expressly ac-
knowledged that informal or implicit but nevertheless legally binding rules exist at the
national level, noting that "some very strong institutions, such as the British constitution, rely
principally on unwritten rules." KEOHANE, International Institutions: Two Approaches, supra,
at 163.
79. KEOHANE, Neoliberal Institutionalism, supra note 62, at 5.
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will, or at least at the will of the most powerful among them.8° Despite
the fact that redefinition may not occur, and indeed may be undesirable
-because of the benefits derived from the institution or difficult because
of the widespread consensus which may be required to do so, law
remains vulnerable to short-term variations in the power relationships
among states.
81
The same is true of the institutions which Young has described. For
Young, all social institutions, including international institutions, arise as
a result of "the conjunction of behavioral regularities -and convergent
expectations."" This conjunction "commonly produces identifiable social
conventions, which actors conform to without making elaborate calcula-
tions on a case-by-case basis ....
Young's institutions, like Keohane's, are subject to rapid change as
a result of evolving power relationships and have no truly independent
force. The furthest Young went was to point out that "[i]nstitutions
change in response to an array of political, economic, technological,
sociocultural, and even moral developments.' 84 Yet it is these develop-
ments which affect the relative interests and power of different states,
which in turn change international institutions. Young was, in fact,
writing about how different developments concerning different sources
of power affect states, how- they choose to behave, and what they are
able to create in the way of international institutions.
Young and Keohane have ascribed great influence to institutions.
They are, in this respect, very different from what Young has referred to
as the "[o]rthodox students of international relations" who "assume that
international institutions, including regimes of various sorts, are mere
surface reflections of underlying forces or processes, subject to change
with every shift in the real determinants of collective outcomes. 8 5
80. Keohane has posited that "changes in the relative power resources available to major
states will explain changes in international regimes." ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, The Theory of
Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes, 1967-1977, in INTER-
NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND STATE POWER, supra note 6, at 74, 75. He has also written that
"[i]n modem international relations, the pressures from domestic interests, and those generated
by the competitiveness of the state system, exert much stronger effects on state policy than do
international institutions, even broadly defined." KEOHANE, Neoliberal Institutionalism, supra
note 62, at 6. He added that his theory "emphasizes the pervasive significance of international
institutions without denigrating the role of state power." Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
81. See generally KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 69, at 85-109; see also
discussion infra pp. 166-68.
82. YOUNG, supra note 2, at 81.
83. Id. at 82 (footnote omitted).
84. Id. at 205.
85. Id. at 58. As an example of the orthodox international relations reaction to regime
theory and institutionalism, Young cited Susan Strange, Cave! hic dragones: A Critique of
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However, neither of them has been able to go on to demonstrate con-
vincingly that any international institution, whether an organization,
treaty or customary rule, is in any way truly independent, from the
power relationships which exist among states.
. Young, to his credit, has recognized this failure. He has written that
"[o]ne of the more surprising features of the emerging literature on
regimes is the relative absence of sustained discussions of the signifi-
cance of regimes, or, more broadly, social institutions, as determinants
of collective outcomes at the international level. 86 The result, he con-
cluded,
is something of an analytic vacuum. The ultimate justification for
devoting substantial time and energy to the study of regimes must
be the proposition that we can account for a good deal of the
variance in collective outcomes at the international level in terms
of the impact of institutional arrangements. For the most part,
however, this proposition is relegated to the realm of assumptions
rather than brought to the forefront as a focus for analytical and
empirical investigation.87
In short, international relations scholars have generally failed to dem-
onstrate that international institutions actually make a difference, that
they qualify the application of state power in some significant way.
This article is in part an attempt to help fill the "analytic vacuum"
Young has described, to demonstrate that international institutions are
not, at the relevant level of analysis, ."epiphenomena whose dictates are
apt to be ignored Whenever actors .find it inconvenient or costly to
comply with them and whose substantive provisions are readily change-
able whenever powerful members of the community find them cumber-
Regime Analysis, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, supra note 62, at 337. YOUNG, supra note 2,
at 58 n.2.
86. YOUNG, supra note 2, at 206. Young cited Krasner, supra note 62, at 5-10, and THE
ANTINOMIES OF INTERDEPENDENCE 462-65 (John G. Ruggie ed., 1983) as partial attempts
which have been made. See also Thomas J. Biersteker, Constructing Historical
Counterfactuals to Assess the Consequences of International Regimes, in REGIME THEORY
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 4, at 315; Helmut Breitmeier & Klaus D. Wolf,
Analysing Regime Consequences, in REGIME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra
note 4, at 339.
87. YOUNG, supra note 2, at 206-07; see also Andrew Hurrell, International Society and
the Study of Regimes, in REGIME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 4, at
49, 53 ("The central problem, then, for regime theorists and international lawyers is to
establish that laws and norms exercise a compliance pull of their own, at least partially
independent of the power and interests which :underpinned them and which were often
responsible for their creation.") (citation omitted).
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some or otherwise outmoded."88 The process of customary international
law is, it will be suggested, a power-qualifying social institution of the
kind for which many international relations scholars are searching. 9
III. THE PROCESS OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
LAW AS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION
International lawyers usually claim that customary international law
results from the coexistence of two elements. First, there must be a
consistent and general practice among states. Second, states must believe
that this practice is required by law.' This second, subjective element is
frequently referred to as opinio juris sive necessitatis, or opinio juris for
short. There are many problems with this general understanding of
customary international law. They cannot be reviewed in detail here, but
they can be divided into three problem groups. First, there are problems
associated with the subjective element of opiniojuris, such as the cogni-
tive problem of how artificial entities called states can "believe," the
chronological problem of requiring states creating new law to believe
that they are behaving in accordance with existing law, and the
epistemological problem of determining the content of this second
element of opinio juris using the only evidence available, the first
element of state practice. Second, there are problems associated with
determining the law-creating effect of different kinds and differing
degrees of repetition and consistency of state practice. Finally, there are
problems associated with the concept of state equality and assumptions
of procedural objectivity, This article focuses on this third category.
Over the years there have been many attempts to explain the process
of customary international law in a theoretically coherent way.9' The
88. YOUNG, supra note 2, at 208. For other attempts to demonstrate the normative
independence of international law see, e.g., FRANCIS A. BOYLE, WORLD POLITICS AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1985); Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE (2d ed. 1979);
Brownlie, The Relation of Law and Power, supra note 28; Fried, supra note 5.
89. For an acknowledgement of the need for international relations scholars to address
the issue of customary international law, see Kratochwil, Contracts and Regimes, supra note
5, at 73, 84-93.
90. See generally STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 38(1)(b)
[hereinafter ICJ STATUTE]; North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.),
1969 I.C.J. 3, at 44 para. 77 (Feb. 20); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 4-11 (4th ed. 1990); OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 27, at
25-31; Rudolf Bernhardt, Customary International Law, in I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 898-902 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1992); Danilenko, supra note 15.
91. The more notable efforts include: D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW, supra note 20; JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 238-45
(1980); THIRLWAY, supra note 15; Akehurst, supra note 1; Cheng, supra note 19; Corbett,
supra note 5; Charles De Visscher, Coutuwe et traiti en droit international public, 59 REVUE
[Vol. 17:109
Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules
number and diversity of these attempts and the growing interest of
scholars in the subject are strong indications of how the discipline of
international law craves a more convincing rationalization. It is therefore
surprising that no legal scholar has yet reached out to the discipline of
international relations in an attempt to explain the process of customary
international law as a social institution in a political system made up of
socially unequal, self-interested states.
Based on the definitions provided by Keohane and Young, the
process of customary international law is clearly a social institution. In
Keohane's terms it is a persistent and connected set of informal rules
which prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expecta-
tions.92 In Young's terms it is an identifiable social convention which
results from the convergence of patterned behavior and actor expecta-
tions, and to which states conform without making elaborate calculations
on a case-by-case basis.93 The similarities between Young's definition of
institutions and traditional definitions of customary international law,
namely the convergence of state practice and opinio juris, are striking.94
As a social institution the process of customary international law is
above all a set of shared beliefs, expectations or understandings held by
the individual human beings who govern and represent states. Like all
institutions, and the international system itself, it is a set of ideas.95 The
most fundamental idea is that the behavior of states with respect to a
GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC [R.G.D.I.P.] 353 (1955); Dupuy, supra note 22;
Paul Guggenheim, Les deux Rlments de la coutume en Droit international, in 1 LA TECH-
NIQUE ET LES PRINCIPES DU DROIT PUBLIC, ETUDES EN L'HONNEUR DE GEORGES SCELLE 275
(1950); Raman, Toward a General Theory, supra note 21; Raman, Prescription of Internation-
al Law by Customary Practice, supra note 42. Recent efforts of note include: Peter
Haggenmacher, La doctrine des deux iliments du droit coutumier dans la pratique de la cour
internationale, 90 R.G.D.I.P. 5 (1986); Fredric L. Kirgis, Jr., Custom on a Sliding Scale, 81
AM. J. INT'L L. 146 (1987); Martti Koskenniemi, The Normative Force of Habit: Internation-
al Custom and Social Theory, FI NISH Y.B. INT'L L. 77 (1990); Koskenniemi, The Pull of
the Mainstream, supra note 47; Weisburd, supra note 32; and WOLFKE, supra note 15.
92. KEOHANE, Neoliberal Institutionalism, supra note 62, at 3.
93. YOUNG, supra note 2, at 81-82. The process of customary international law would
also seem to fit within the scope of the well-known definition of international regimes
provided by Krasner. See Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as
Intervening Variables, supra note 62.
94. But see the discussion of opinio juris, infra part lII.A. It should also be noted that
Young has been somewhat inconsistent with respect to his definition of social institutions.
Near the end of his book he defined them as "behaviorally recognizable practices consisting
of roles linked together by clusters of rules or conventions governing relations among the
occupants of these roles." YOUNG, supra note 2, at 196. Actor expectations are not a part of
this latter definition.
95. See ANTHONY CARTY, THE DECAY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW? 20-21 (1986); Kos-
KENNIEMI, supra note 45; ALLOTr, supra note 5, at 145-77; James Crawford, Negotiating
Global Security Threats in a World of Nation States: Issues and Problems of Sovereignty, 38
AM. BEHAV. Sci. 867 (1995); Karen Knop, Re/Statements: Feminism and State Sovereignty in
International Law, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 293 (1993).
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legal issue provides an indication of the degree to which those states are
interested in seeing a particular legal outcome.96 Not all states will agree
as to which legal outcome is most desirable. The process of customary
international law resolves many of these sorts of differences by acting as
a kind of "universalising public interest phenomenon '97 which creates
legally binding rules when the behavior of states indicates that most
states would find their creation either desirable or acceptable, and only a
few, or none at all, would not find it so.9s
This general idea - that the behavior of states provides an indica-
tion of the degree to which they are interested in seeing a particular
legal outcome - is fleshed out by a number of other ideas or shared
understandings. These shared understandings determine what behavior is
relevant to the process of customary international law, as well as the
degree to which, and the manner in which, that behavior is relevant.99
96. The interests of states are not necessarily identical, or even similar to the interests of
those individuals who live within states. But see discussions of the statist assumption, supra
note 4 and internal political processes, infra note 98.
97. This expression was first used to refer to the process of customary international law
by Philip Allott in a graduate seminar on the History and Theory of International Law at the
University of Cambridge during the Lent Term 1994. For a brief written formulation see
Philip Allott, The International Court and the Voice of Justice, in FIFTY YEARS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SIR ROBERT JENNINGS (Vaughn
Lowe & Malgosia Fitzmaurice eds., forthcoming 1995).
98. This may be a particularly useful insight for international relations scholars. Christo-
pher Joyner has stated that: "[p]olitical science can gain from international law by accepting
the proposition that the law is a significant means for organizing political forces, for setting
perceptions of national interests, and for promoting ways to attain those national interests."
Christopher C. Joyner, Crossing the Great Divide: Views of a Political Scientist Wandering in
the World of International Law, 81 AM.'Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 385, 390 (1987). In this way
the customary process fulfills the main purpose of all of Keohane's institutions in that it
facilitates.cooperation, and does so in a way which takes into account variations in the mutual
interest of states. As with all of Keohane's institutions, variations in the mutual interest,
acting through the institution, have substantial effects on state behavior, in this case through
the development of new customary rules. See KEOHANE, Neoliberal Institutionalism, supra
note 62, at 2-3.
It should be noted that both institutionalism and the theory of customary international
law set out in this article assume that each state has engaged in some sort of internal political
process in order to balance competing interests within the state, and that states use interna-
tional institutions, in this case the customary process, to translate those determinations of
individual state interest into global interests in the absence of more formalized political
structures at the international level. In contrast, some scholars, such as those making up the
New Haven School and more recent "liberal" authors, have sought to break down the divide
between the determination of interests nationally and internationally. See, e.g., LASSWELL &
McDoUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY, supra note 7, at 417-25; Reisman, The
View from the New Haven School of International Law, supra note 41, at 122; Burley, supra
note 2. For a defense of the statist stance adopted here, see supra note 4.
99. See N.E. Simmonds, Between Positivism and Idealism, 50 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 308
(1991) (discussing the importance of shared understandings to legal systems generally); see
generally MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983) (discussing the importance of
shared understandings to social interaction and distributive justice).
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A. Shared Understandings of Legal Relevance
A first set of these shared understandings requires that state behav-
ior, in order to contribute to the customary process, must be carried
out in a legally relevant manner.'0° These shared understandings will
accept or reject behavior based on what states openly do or admit to
doing,'' on what they do not do, on what state representatives say, or
on the basis of the context in which the behavior takes place.0 2 To
use a classic example from the latter category, using white paper for
diplomatic correspondence is not behavior relevant to a legal or poten-
tially legal issue. 10 3 In contrast, using a, sealed bag for diplomatic
correspondence and respecting that seal is legally relevant behavior.
The decisive factor distinguishing *this legally relevant from legally
irrelevant behavior is the context in which the behavior takes place.
Context, physical acts, omissions, claims, denials, concealments and
the submission of disputes to courts or tribunals all may indicate that
a state views a particular issue, or behavior linked to that issue, as
having legal relevance.
Traditional theories of customary international law rely on opinio
juris to determine legal relevance. In brief, a state must believe that
what it is doing is in accordance' with an existing rule of customary
international law. There are, of course, problems with this traditional
100. See Haggenmacher, supra note 91, at 108-25 (suggesting that opinio juris involves
the interpretation of state practice within a "shared conceptual universe") (author's transla-
tion). These shared understandings of legal relevance' will normally, but not necessarily,
precede the behavior which is subjected to them. In this sense opinio juris, see discussion
infra pp. 139-42, usually comes before the behavior which gives rise to any specific rule.
This might be seen as being consistent with the order expressed in the ICJ Statute:
"[lI]nternational custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law." ICJ STATUTE art.
38(1)(b). See OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 27, at 26 n.5: However, this
article does not assume that states are always aware of the potential law creating effects of
their behavior, nor that they invariably know the legal outcomes they are seeking. It is
possible that these understandings could develop ex post facto. See, e.g., Nuclear Tests (Aus.
v. Fr.),' 1974 I.C.J. 253.
101. It is assumed for the purposes of this article that actions which are denied or
concealed by states are not considered as constituting behavior capable of contributing to the
maintenance, development, or change of customary rules. However, the denial or concealment
may itself be considered to be such behavior. The most obvious example of this involves
actions in violation of the prohibition against torture. See RODLEY, supra note 36. But see
Weisburd, supra note 32. Pleadings before and decisions of international arbitral tribunals
which the parties wish to keep confidential, but which are leaked, constitute another, more
controversial example.
102. Simmonds, for one, has stressed the importance of context to shared understandings.
See Simmonds, supra note 99, at 318.
103. This example is drawn from Akehurst, supra note 1, at 33.
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formulation."° Of the many attempts to address these problems, one of
the most attractive is Anthony D'Amato's suggestion that a rule must be
"articulated" in a way that will be noticed by states before or in con-
junction with state practice in order for that practice to be able to con-
tribute to the process of customary international law.
05
Yet D'Amato's suggestion fails to provide a solution for situations
such as that of the sealed diplomatic bag where no explicit "articulation"
may have been made, unless one treats the context of the behavior -
diplomatic documents in a sealed bag - as some sort of implicit articu-
lation. And this, in turn, brings one back to shared understandings of
legal relevance. Opinio juris, in terms of states believing ,that they are
acting in accordance with preexisting or simultaneously developing legal
rules, is not particularly helpful, either as a practical tool for determin-
ing the existence of customary rules, or as an explanation of how those
rules arise. 1°6
Analyses of the judgments of the International Court have support-
ed this conclusion, since the Court, while supporting the concept of
opinio juris in principle, has repeatedly ignored it in practice.'0 7 In-
stead, the Court has followed the same approach to determining legal
relevancy as is suggested in this article: examining what states have
openly done or admitted to doing, what in some cases they have not
done, what state representatives have said, and the context in which
that behavior has taken place.
Opinio juris is, however, a useful concept if used to refer to the
shared understandings, such as those concerning the legal relevance of
behavior, which constitute the process of customary international law.
Although what states, or more precisely the human beings who represent
104. See supra pp. 136-37.
105. See D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 20,
74-87.
106. Some scholars have suggested that opinio juris could be forward-looking, as a
widespread consideration on the part of states that it is desirable and appropriate that a
particular rule be adopted. See FINNIS, supra note 91, at 238-45; Crawford & Viles, supra
note 19, at 66-67; Dupuy, supra note 22, at 849. However, this approach renders opinio juris
relatively meaningless, as any change in any law will almost invariably result from the will of
lawmakers to see that change occur. Furthermore, if one understands this forward-looking
opinio juris as a required constitutive element of any customary rule - an element which
must, in certain situations, be proved - it begins to look a great deal like D'Amato's
articulation, although it would seem to restrict the expression of opinio juris to a narrower
range of actors than D'Amato's articulation does. This concept of opinio juris does not
account for the shared understandings as to the process and parameters of law creation which
control the maintenance, development, and change of rules of customary international law.
107. See Haggenmacher, supra note 91; see also MERON, supra note 30, at 36 (discuss-
ing the Nicaragua case); MacGibbon, supra note 15, at 128-29 (discussing the Permanent
Court of International Justice).
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them, believe, will only be apparent from their behavior, and. even
though the assignation of legal relevance to behavior will, often be
recognized and passed over in silence, the whole exercise reflects deeper
understandings that are akin to Ludwig Wittgenstein's "form of life."'
08
Law is not, in H.L.A. Hart's terms, "behavior at the point of a gun,""
but is instead reflective of a deeper social consciousness."'
These shared understandings are most significant in the domain of
the process of law creation rather than at the level of individual rules. It
is the social institution of the process of customary international law
which best represents "the conjunction of behavioral regularities and
convergent expectations.' With respect to a particular customary rule,
for example, that a diplomatic bag is inviolable, the convergent expecta-
tions which are of greatest importance during the period in which the
rule is developing relate to the process through .which that rule develops
rather than to the content of the rule in question. Only after the rule has
come into being will there be a shared belief in its existence; before that
time any shared belief will be with respect to the process through which
the rule could arise, and perhaps to the desirability of that rule arising."2
Opinio juris should therefore be regarded above all as the shared belief
in the process of customary international law, and more precisely, as the
shared understandings that constitute that process.3
108. See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 226-27 (G.E.M.
Anscombe trans., 2d ed. 1958).
109. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF, LAW 18-20 (1961); H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON
BENTHAM: STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL THEORY 243-68 (1982).
110. Carty has traced the origin of the concept of customary international law, and the
idea of opinio juris, to the German historical school of Friedrich von Savigny and Leopold
von Ranke. According to this approach opinio juris is the common will, or legal conscious-
ness of a Volk, or people. CARTY, supra note 95, at 30-35. But Carty's attempt to revitalize
this approach continues to restrict it to within nations, and to nationalism. See id. at 36-39.
This article argues for a broader, more inclusive notion of community. The degree of shared
consciousness is, consequently, much reduced.
11. YOUNG, supra note 2, at 81.
112. See the comments on Finnis' approach to opinio juris, supra note 106.
113. Simmonds has made similar reference to the importance of shared understandings as
relating to legal processes, rather than just individual rules. He has written:
But suppose that we think of the law as developing relatively clear and settled rules
that reflect, but stabilise, pre-existing informal rules and convergent patterns of
behavior. Might not the "rule of recognition" (for example) then be thought of as a
further level of reflection and stabilisation? This time it would not be informal
rules of conduct amongst the general populace that would be reflected and
stabilised, but the convergent practices and expectations of lawyers and others in
looking to certain texts (such as judgments, decrees, scholarly writings, etc.) and
employing certain forms of argument in the decision of disputes and the interpreta-
tion of rules.
Simmonds, supra note 99, at 319.
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The fact that shared understandings are most importantwith respect
to the process of customary international law, rather than with respect to
specific rules, is one of the reasons why power is able to play an impor-
tant role in that process. The shared understandings which constitute the
customary process are largely immune to fluctuations in the relative
power positions of states. Like a number of similarly near-immutable
structural principles of international law, these shared understandings
accommodate the frequently asymmetrical applications of state power
which maintain, develop or change customary rules in such a way as to
challenge severely assumptions of procedural objectivity without deny-
ing all stability and determinacy to international law.
B. Shared Understandings of the Relationship Between
Interest, Behavior, and Cost
Another shared understanding of importance to the process of cus-
tomary international law is that the behavior of states with respect to a
legal or potentially legal issue must be assessed so as to determine if
there is a substantially shared interest in any particular legal outcome.
This shared understanding rests on an essentially "realist" assumption:
that states behave in accordance with their own interests." 4 However,
because states determine their own interests, those interests may involve
much more than maximizing power in relation to other states. Much will
depend on the internal political system of the state concerned, its rela-
tive affluence, and the existence or perception of external threats, which
could include threats of a military, economic or environmental nature.
Linking behavior to interest is essential to explaining the process
of customary international law. It enables one to distinguish different
kinds of behavior, different kinds of states, and different kinds of legal
rules - all of which have varying effects on the customary process.
This link also provides an explanation as to why some customary rules
require a great deal of supporting behavior from states while others
appear to arise more out of shared values than state behavior, and,
further, as to why different customary rules have varying degrees of
resistance to change. Finally, this analysis allows consideration of
different sources of power to be incorporated into an analysis of
customary international law.
Different kinds of behavior result in different costs for states, with
cost being calculated in military, economic, political or human terms.
Some acts, such as protecting one's fishing vessels in distant waters or
114. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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imposing trade sanctions against another state, may be very costly.
Diplomatic communications or statements in international organizations
will usually entail far lower costs. An enormous range of possible
actions and statements exists, with a correspondingly broad range of
costs. A state, when contemplating whether to engage in legally relevant
behavior in support of, or in opposition to, an existing, emerging, or
potential customary rule Will weigh these costs against its interest in
each particular legal outcome. All states engage in similar calculations,
and since the customary process operates by measuring states' interests
before creating appropriate rules, that process therefore accords greater
weight to behavior involving greater cost than it does to behavior in-
volving less cost." 5 It is for this reason that acts usually carry more
weight than statements in the process of customary international law."
6
However, due to the varying level of resources among states, the
costs associated with a particular action may be negligible for one state
and prohibitive for another. Some states will lack the capacity, let alone
the resources, to engage in certain types of action." 7 The process of
customary international law, as a universalizing public -interest phe-
nomenon, clearly takes such disparities among states into some account,
which helps explain why the United States, the United Kingdom, and
Japan have found themselves together as persistent objectors to at least
one new customary rule." 8 Greater weight will be accorded to a state-
ment coming from a state's representative in a situation in which that
state could not act than will be accorded to a statement from that same
representative in a situation in which the state could act. Similarly, acts
by some states will sometimes carry more weight than similar acts by
other states. Trade sanctions imposed by a small, economically vulnera-
ble state against its main trading partner are likely to be considered
more legally significant than trade sanctions imposed by a large, wealthy
state against a state with which it has only limited trading links.
115. A similar analysis was presented by Raman in his Yale S.J.D. thesis:
Where the parties are in disagreement as to the significance of past events to the
determination of the requirements for present decision, the extent to which base
values were expended by them may create a modest presumption that there were
shared expectations about such requirements for decision. It is therefore appropriate
in examining the authoritativeness of a practice to take into account the extent of
commitment made by the parties through the base values at their disposal, which in
this connection includes not only power and wealih but all other values.
Raman, Prescription of International Law by Customary Practice, supra note 42, at 466.
116. See Akehurst, supra note 1, at 2 n.l.
117. See, e.g., the comments on internal, political limitations on state action, supra note
16.
118. See discussion infra note 182 and accompanying text.
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This assessment may be skewed, however, by the fact that the more
powerful state usually will be able to allocate more resources to publi-
cizing its legally relevant behavior, and will likely attract more attention
than less powerful states as a result." 9 In addition, more powerful states
are usually watched more closely than less powerful states. All other
things being equal, the actions of more powerful states are accorded
greater weight by the customary process than the actions of less power-
ful states. Thus, the process of customary international law compensates
only partly for power disparities among states.'20
Since a rule of customary international law develops when most
states behave as if they favor, or at least do not object to, the develop-
ment of that particular rule, determining whether a rule exists usually
involves weighing supporting, ambivalent, and opposing behavior.1 2'
119. Only the most affluent of states publish digests of their own legally relevant
behavior. Australia (AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L.), Belgium (R.B.D.I.), Canada (CAN. Y.B. INT'L
L.), France (A.F.D.I.), Germany (Z.A.6.R.V.), Italy (Riv. D.I.), Japan (JAPAN. ANN. INT'L L.),
South Africa (S. AFR. Y.B. INT'L L.), Switzerland (SCHw.J.i.R.) and the United Kingdom
(BIUT. Y.B. INT'L L.) do. China, Russia and India do not. Surprisingly, the United States has
recently decided to cease publication of the Digest of United States Practice in International
Law.
120. This article is thus careful not to assume that the rules which result from the
customary process, or the way in which the process itself operates, are satisfactory to all
states. See discussion of D'Amato's approach, supra note 20. Cultural and ideological differ-
ences persist, notwithstanding the predominant influence of western liberal values in the
international legal system. Areas of serious disagreement remain largely unregulated or
indeterminate. However, the fact that all states rely, to one degree or another, on rules of
customary international law indicates that certain long-standing shared understandings are
present as to the way in which the customary process operates.
121. See, e.g., Akehurst, supra note 1, at 13-14. This behavior necessarily exists on a
spectrum. For example, the strength with which a state voices its opposition to or opposes
through actions, an existing, emerging or potential rule may vary depending on the impor-
tance the state attaches to the outcome it desires. This article reduces the spectrum to three
positions - supporting, ambivalent, and opposing - solely for explanatory purposes. In
addition, it should be re-emphasized that this theory of customary international law is
essentially consensual in nature because a state, having accepted the process of customary
international law supports or acquiesces in, for example, the development of a new rule
knowing that its behavior will contribute to the development of the rule. See discussion supra
note 5 and accompanying text. If it opposes the development of that rule and does so consis-
tently, but is not successful in preventing its development, it will find itself in the position of
a persistent objector with all of its rights under international law preserved. See discussion
infra pp. 162-65.
Koskenniemi has argued that the concept of acquiescence in this context "tends to be a
camouflage for arguing from a conception of justice, most frequently from the principle that
legitimate expectations should not be ignored." He asserted that "[it is not really - despite
appearances - a consensual argument at all." Koskenniemi, The Pull of the Mainstream,
supra note 47, at 1951. However, Koskenniemi used a strict definition of consent, one that
did not accord with the social construction of that concept adopted by states. States base
legitimate expectations on acquiescence to the maintenance, development, or change of rules
of customary international law because the shared understandings which make up the custom-
ary process include an understanding to the effect that a state which acquiesces to the
maintenance, development, or change of a rule is not objecting, and therefore consenting to it.
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Such a weighing process begins when behavior which could support
a new rule appears. For instance, suppose that State A wants a new rule
to develop and therefore acts in accordance with, or issues a statement
in support of, its preferred new rule. State B is ambivalent towards the
new rule and does nothing. State C does not want the new rule to
develop and therefore acts in a way which would be in violation of the
new rule, were it to develop, or issues a statement objecting to it. All
other states are in the position of State A, State B or State C. If there
are many State As, some State Bs, and only a few State Cs, the pro-
posed rule will become a rule of customary international law and the
State Cs may become persistent objectors.' If there are few State As,
some State Bs, and many State Cs, the proposed rule will not develop.
In either case the State As, had they acted in violation of an existing
rule in order to indicate their support for a new rule, would have vio-
lated customary international law. However, the fact that widespread
support is required for a new rule to develop makes it unlikely that a
successful State A would be regarded as legally responsible for such a
violation, except perhaps by persistent objectors, if there are any. The
question therefore becomes more one of opposability than breach.
The two examples above are relatively straightforward. Frequently,
the balance between supporting and opposing states is not so clear, or
the different kinds of behavior do not fall within three strictly definable
groups. Consequently, it will be. more difficult to determine whether a
rule has developed or changed. The different weights accorded to differ-
ent acts, omissions, and statements in different contexts further compli-
cate matters, as does the self-evident nature of some shared interests.
C. The Self-Evident Nature of Some Shared Interests
Rules of customary international law also differ on the basis of the
relative amounts of supporting behavior, as compared to opposing
behavior, necessary for them to come into existence. Some scholars
have pointed to international human rights as one area where rule cre-
Consequently, Koskenniemi has failed to break out of the consensual mould. Whether states
acquiesce because of larger, shared conceptions of justice or morality is another, more valid
question. See discussions infra part III.C and pp. 165-67.
It should also be noted that this consensual explanation is not compromised by the
emergence of new states as there is an important difference between the act of joining the
club of law creators and participation in the process of law creation. New states invariably
rely on some rules of customary international law. By doing so they accept the process by
which those rules have arisen, as well as a place in that ongoing process. See generally
discussion supra note 5 and accompanying text. This then provides them with the opportunity
to seek to change such rules as do not correspond with their interests.
122. For more on persistent objection, see discussion infra pp. 162-65.
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ation involves a lower behavioral threshold or burden of proof.' As
noted earlier, Koskenniemi has suggested that customary international
law in the human rights field is determined not by formal tests of legal
validity, but by an "anterior - though in some respects largely shared
- criterion of what is right and good for human life."" 4
If the customary process, by determining the interests of individual
states in particular rules, operates to maximize the interests of states as
a whole, the weighing of supporting, ambivalent, and opposing behavior
may be understood as a facilitative, and not always necessary, exercise.
In other words, although the interests of states will usually become clear
through a careful examination of their actions and statements, in some
instances their interests may be so obvious that such a careful weighing
of behavior is not required.
This conclusion appears to explain many of those customary rules
which attract the label jus cogens, such as the most fundamental of
human rights or the rule of non-intervention.'25 Other customary rules,
including most other international human rights, also benefit from the
self-evident nature of some shared interests in that, even if the relevant
shared interests are not sufficiently clear or widely shared to create a
123. See, e.g., MERON, supra note 30, at 113; Schachter, International Law in Theory
and Practice, supra note 14, at 336. Schachter included the rules against aggression and on
self-defence within the same category. Schachter, Entangled Treaty and Custom, supra note
14, at 734. For a similar, although not identical view, see Kirgis, supra note 91, at 149.
124. Koskenniemi made a point which, intuitively, must be correct:
Some norms seem so basic, so important, that it is more than slightly artificial to
argue that states are legally bound to comply with them simply because there exists
an agreement between them to that effect, rather than because, in the words of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), noncompliance would "shock [] the conscience
of mankind" and be contrary to "elementary considerations of humanity".
Koskenniemi, The Pull of the Mainstream, supra note 47, at 1946-47 (footnote omitted)
(quoting from the advisory opinion on Reservations to the Convention on the Preservation
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and the judgment in the Corfu Channel case).
For a similar argument from an international relations scholar, see Hurrell, supra note
87, at 65-66. This section of this article attempts to respond, in part, to Hurrell's concern
about the artificial separation of order and justice in academic explanations of international
relations and international law. Id. at 65-69.
125. This conclusion may explain, in part, why the International Court did not feel it
necessary in the Nicaragua case to examine the past conduct of states with respect to the rule
of non-intervention. See Nicaragua Case, supra note 25. Schachter wrote that "states and
tribunals do not question the continued force of those rules [on self-defense and against
aggression, genocide, torture, etc.] because of inconsistent or insufficient practice.... This is
not because the rules express 'noble aspirations' . . . but. . . because they express deeply-held
and widely shared convictions about the unacceptability of the proscribed conduct."
Schachter, Entangled Treaty and Custom, supra note 14, at 734. In addition, the fact that all
states have an obvious interest in these rules goes a long way to explaining the erga omnes
character which it is frequently asserted that jus cogens rules have. It may also explain the
ease and frequency with which natural law arguments are applied in support of them.
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rule by themselves, their existence reduces the relative degree of sup-
porting behavior necessary to do so. Thus, the self-evident nature of
some shared interests frequently works together with supporting behav-
ior to create rules of customary international law. 26 Consequently,
although there is clearly something different about how some customary
rules arise, this difference can be understood as working with rather than
against the normal process of customary international law, a process
which usually, but not necessarily, weighs supporting, ambivalent, and
opposing behavior to determine shared interests before protecting and
promoting those interests with law.'27
D. Varying Degrees of Resistance to Change
As a result of the weighing of supporting, ambivalent, and opposing
behavior, as well as the self-evident nature of some shared interests,
some customary rules are stronger than others in terms of their resis-
126. Supporting behavior may also prove useful in guarding against problems of cultural
relativism by demonstrating that the interests really are shared. It should also be noted that
some, but not all of these self-evident shared interests might be labelled values. See discus-
sion supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text. However, it is an objective, and not a subjec-
tive phenomenon which is being described here.
127. This role of the customary process as a means of identifying state interests through
behavior, and the role played by the self-evident nature of some shared interests, may.go a
long way towards explaining Koskenniemi's larger concern. He has written:
The dynamics of international legal argument are provided by the constant
effort of lawyers to show that their law is either concrete or normative and their
becoming thus vulnerable to the charge that such law is in fact political because
apologist or utopian. Different doctrinal and practical controversies turn on transfor-
mations of this dilemma. It lies behind such dichotomies as "positiv-
ism"/"naturalism", "consent"/"justice", "autonomy"/"community", "process"/"rule",
etc., and explains why these and other oppositions keep recurring and do not seem
soluble in a permanent way. They recur because it seems possible to defend one's
legal argument only by showing either its closeness to, or its distance from, state
practice.
Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law, supra note 47, at 8 (summarizing FROM
APOLOGY TO UTOPIA).
If, as this article argues, the closeness to, or distance from state behavior depends on the
self-evident, or non-self-evident nature of states' interests in a particular rule, then
Koskenniemi's apologetic/utopian dilemma may be nothing more than Simmonds' positiv-
ism/idealism tension playing itself out on the international plane. While Koskenniemi has
viewed the situation as proof of the incoherence and political subjectivity of (international)
law, Simmonds has embraced and celebrated the complexity as truly reflective of human
society. See Simmonds, supra note 99. In addition, this explanation of the capacity of the
self-evident nature of some shared interests to give rise to customary rules may account, at
least in part, for McDougal's famous reliance on "the test of reasonableness" to determine
that the United States had the right to create a sizeable exclusion zone on the high seas for
the purposes of atmospheric nuclear tests. Myres S. McDougal, Comment, The Hydrogen
Bomb Tests and the International Law of the Sea, 49 AM. J. INT'L L. 356, 361 (1955). For
McDougal, if not for others, it was self-evident that the defense of "the values of a free world
society" was a shared interest of sufficient importance to support such a rule. Id.
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tance to change. For instance, a rule which every state has supported,
towards which no state has been ambivalent, and which none has op-
posed will be extremely difficult to change. In contrast, a rule which
one state has supported and towards which all other states have been
ambivalent Will be at the mercy of any opposing state.'28 Similarly, the
resistance to change of a customary rule will be increased if states have
a self-evident shared interest in it, and, as was noted in the previous
section of this article, the self-evident nature of some shared interests
and the weighing of supporting, ambivalent, and opposing behavior will
sometimes work together to create a higher degree of resistance to
change. 29
The most interesting consequence of this phenomenon is that some
rules have received so much support that they have become, for all
practical purposes, immutable. Although it is conceivable that enough
opposing behavior could destroy the most resistant of rules, this possi-
bility is only theoretical with respect to a number of rules, which con-
sequently provide a framework for the rest of the international legal
system. 30 These "structural principles," although derived from the
process of customary international law, or at least an earlier process akin
to it, now guide and qualify the application of state power in the mainte-
nance, development, and change of less resistant, non-structural custom-
ary rules.
The most fundamental of these structural principles are those which
define or characterize the state, as states are almost entirely responsible
for the behavior which makes and changes international law.' 3' Four
such principles can be identified: jurisdiction, personality, reciprocity,
128. See generally Akehurst, supra note 1, at 13-14, 19; D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF
CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 20, at 91-93.
129. The passage of time is also a factor. All other things being equal, more recent
behavior is accorded more weight than less recent behavior. However, this adjustment may be
offset by the fact that a well-established rule frequently attracts a higher degree of legitimate
expectation than a less well-established rule. See discussion infra part VII.
130. It is, however, still a possibility, albeit one which would threaten the current
international legal system, contrary to the interests of at least the more powerful states, and
which consequently might necessitate the development of new rules to replace those de-
stroyed. For similar views as to the mutability of fundamental, or constitutional rules, see Roif
E. Sartorius, Hart's Concept of. Law, in MORE ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 131, 158-59
(Robert Summers ed., 1971); N.E. Simmonds, Why Conventionalism Does Not Collapse into
Pragmatism, 49 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 63, 77-79 (1990); Simmonds, Between Positivism and
Idealism, supra note 99, at 320-21. Contra HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 109, at
89-96. For a strong suggestion that Hart's approach might be appropriate in international
legal theory, see Pellet, supra note 13, at 39-40.
131. See discussion supra note 4.
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and legitimate expectation. 132 In short, states are entities which have
jurisdiction, which is primarily, but not exclusively, territorially based.
They have full international legal personality, which gives them the
competence to represent themselves and their nationals in international
law. They are formally equal and therefore entitled to the same general
rights and subject to the same general obligations, as is ensured through
the principle of reciprocity. Finally, states are not subject to the applica-
tion of rules of international law unless they consent, as is provided by
the principle of legitimate expectation, which subsumes both explicit and
inferred consent.
The final four sections of this article provide examples of how each
of these principles qualifies the application of state power in the custom-
ary process. These examples are not meant to be exhaustive. Instead,
they are presented in an attempt to demonstrate that each of these prin-
ciples affects, in some significant way, the outcome of efforts by states,
through applications of power, to maintain, develop, or change particular
rules of customary international law.
IV. CUSTOM, POWER, AND THE PRINCIPLE OF JURISDICTION
This article has already discussed the fact that some customary rules
differ from others in important ways, such as in terms of their resistance
to change. Some rules and principles of international law have become,
for all practical purposes, immutable. Less resistant rules develop and
change within the structure provided by highly resistant rules and princi-
ples. These less resistant rules can be subdivided in many ways. One of
the more interesting methods of division addresses the relationship to
state territory, as that relationship is defined by the principle of jurisdic-
132. James Crawford identified the following five "exclusive and general legal character-
istics of States":
(1) In principle, States have plenary competence to perform acts, make
treaties, and so on, in the international sphere ....
(2) In principle States are exclusively competent with respect to their internal
affairs ....
(3) In principle States are not subject to compulsory international process,
jurisdiction, or settlement, unless they consent ....
(4) States are regarded in international law as "equal".... It is a formal, not
a moral or political, principle....
(5) Finally, any derogations from these principles must be clearly established:
in case of doubt an international court or tribunal will decide in favour of the
freedom of action of States ....
JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 32-33 (1979). The
four principles examined in this article are derived from and form the basis of these five
characteristics: the first amounts to personality, and the second to jurisdiction. The fourth
involves an aspect of reciprocity, and the third and fifth are both associated with legitimate
expectation.
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tion, and more specifically, by the principle of territorial jurisdiction.' 33
Subdivided in this way, these less resistant, nonstructural rules break
down into internal rules, boundary rules, and external rules.
To understand the differences between internal, boundary, and ex-
ternal rules it is useful to view these nonstructural customary rules as
resulting from tensions among different, more resistant rules or princi-
ples. One rule or principle, such as that of territorial jurisdiction, pulls
one way; another rule or principle, such as that of the freedom of the
high seas, pulls another way. When the behavior of states allows the
tensions among these competing rules or principles to stabilize, the
result is a less resistant rule of customary international law, such as the
rule concerning the breadth of the territorial sea. 34 As a result of these
tensions, and because the factors producing them can always change,
nonstructural rules are often unstable, although some will obviously be
more stable than others.'35 This instability renders nonstructural rules
subject to change with the fluctuating interests and patterns of behavior
of states. These patterns of behavior are linked to the relative power of
states but also are qualified in various ways by the customary process
and by structural principles of international law. How these patterns are
qualified will depend in large part on whether they concern internal,
133. Although the principle of jurisdiction sometimes operates extraterritorially, it is of
greatest importance in the territorial context. Consequently, this article confines itself to
examining the effects of the principle in respect to territory and uses the term "jurisdiction" to
refer only to territorial jurisdiction. In addition, it may be argued that territorial jurisdiction is
not a principle of international law having an effect on the application of power so much as it
is a principle which recognizes and is dependent on the application of power as reflected in a
state's control over territory. However, the boundaries of states are delimited, and statehood
defined, by rules and principles of international law. State-like entities may have preceded the
international legal system, but the power relationships which gave rise to the territorial state
have subsequently been conceptualized, transformed, and legitimized by that system. Were
this not the case, territorial jurisdiction would be a much more fluid concept than it is today.
134. A good expression of this tension with respect to the breadth of the territorial sea
follows:
The limit of this zone [the territorial sea] is ... commonly recognised as extending
to three miles from low-water mark .... It may, indeed, be that the present limit,
in view of modern conditions, needs to be extended; but however desirable such an
extension of territorial rights may be for some purposes, it must, until ratified by
common usage or international agreement, be regarded as inadmissible, and as an
infringement of the principle of the freedom of the sea.
PrTT COBBETT, LEADING CASES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 144 (Hugh H.L. Bellot ed., 4th ed.
1922) (footnotes omitted). Other rules have also resulted from the tension between the
principle of territorial jurisdiction and the freedom of the high seas, the most important of
these being the rule concerning the Exclusive Economic Zone. Another example of a custom-
ary rule developing out of tension between competing principles is the rule concerning state
immunity from jurisdiction. See discussion infra note 138 and accompanying text.
135. For discussion of varying degrees of resistance to change, see supra part III.D. In
the case of boundary rules instability renders them indeterminate. See discussion infra notes
242-43 and accompanying text.
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boundary, or external rules. The paragraphs below examine the differing
effects that applications of power have on these three kinds of rules.
A. Internal Rules
A state is most powerful within the confines of its own borders.
Although states are able to project power outside of their borders, the
strength of that projected power will normally wane further away from
the state, and will generally be weakest within the territories of other
states. These differing degrees of power are the result of control over
territory, itself directly dependent on power, but that control over terri-
tory is legitimized and given effect in the international legal system by
the principle of territorial jurisdiction. 36
Internal rules are rules which states seek to apply to other states
within the territorial jurisdictions of the first states. In these situations,
states with territorial jurisdiction have a power advantage over states
without territorial jurisdiction because they are better able to maintain or
alter behavior patterns with respect to particular legal issues within their
own territory. Such territorially-based control over behavior patterns can
have decisive effects on the maintenance, development, or change of
customary rules, especially if the preponderance of behavior relevant to
any particular legal issue occurs within the territorial jurisdiction of
those states which have a strong interest in maintaining, developing, or
changing a customary rule with respect to that behavior.
A good example of an internal rule involves the rule concerning
state immunity from the jurisdiction of foreign courts, a rule which is
widely regarded as having changed from an absolute to a restrictive
136. See, for example, the following statement by Max Huber in the Island of Palmas
arbitration:
The development of the national organization of states during the last few centuries
and, as a corollary, the development of international law, have established this
principle of the exclusive competence of the state in regard to its own territory in
such a way as to make it the point of departure in settling most questions that
concern international relations.
Island of Palmas Case (U.S. v. Neth.) 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 838 (1928). On the nature of territorial
jurisdiction as a principle of international law, see discussion supra part III.D and note 133. It
should be noted that the traditional principle of territorial jurisdiction is currently under some
challenge, not least by developments in international environmental law. See generally
Canadian Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, as amended (1994), reproduced in 33 I.L.M. 1383
(1994); ALEXANDRE KISS & DINAH SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
115-54 (1991); Alan Raul & Paul Hagen, The Convergence of Trade and Environmental
Law, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Fall 1993, at 3; Michelle L. Schwartz, International Legal
Protection for Victims of Environmental Abuse, 18 YALE J. INT'L L. 355 (1993). On the
legitimizing effect of legal systems, see supra part I.C.
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standard over the course of the last century.'37 The tension in this in-
stance, between the principle of territorial jurisdiction and the principle
of legitimate expectation (in the sense that states cannot be subject to
compulsory jurisdiction without their consent), 3 ' stabilized in favor of
the principle of territorial jurisdiction. The rule of restrictive immunity
developed at least partly because the vast majority of state immunity
disputes arose within the territorial jurisdiction of states which supported
that rule. These states, by applying restrictive immunity within their
borders, were consequently able to alter the preponderance of behavior
with respect to the issue of state immunity worldwide, thus developing
a new, generally applicable rule of customary international law.
A second example of an internal rule involves the attempt by non-
industrialized states to change the customary rule concerning the stan-
dard of compensation for the expropriation of foreign-owned property.
Although this change was strongly resisted by more powerful Western
industrialized states, the non-industrialized states managed to shift the
applicable standard away from that of "prompt, adequate, and effective
compensation."' 39 They were able to do so despite their relative power
disadvantages vis-&-vis the Western industrialized states at least in part
because they had territorial jurisdiction in most situations where the
issue of compensation for expropriation arose. In short, most disputes
over the expropriation of foreign-owned property arose in the non-
industrialized world.
137. For good, standard reviews of the history of the state immunity rule see
OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 27, at 341-63; Sompong Sucharitkul,
Immunities of Foreign States Before National Authorities: Some Aspects of Progressive
Development of Contemporary International Law, in I ESTUDIOS DE DERECHO INTER-
NACIONAL: HOMENAJE AL PROFESOR MIAJA DE LA MUELA 477 (1979); Peter D. Trooboff,
Foreign State Immunity: Emerging Consensus on Principles, 200 R.C.A.D.I. 235 (1986-V).
For somewhat different perspectives see Claude Emanuelli, L'immuniti souveraine et la
coutume internationale: de l'immunitd absolue d l'immuniti relative?, 22 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L.
26 (1984); and discussion infra Part VII.A.
138. See generally James Crawford, Execution of Judgments and Foreign Sovereign
Immunity, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 820, 852, 856 (1981); discussion supra note 134 and
accmpanying text.
139. See generally C.F Amerasinghe, Issues of Compensation for the Taking of Alien
Property in the Light of Recent Cases and Practice, 41 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 22 (1992);
RudolfDolzer, New Foundations of the Law of Expropriation of Alien Property, 75 AM. J.
INT'L L. 553 (1981); Richard B. Lillich, The Valuation of Nationalized Property in Interna-
tional Law: Toward a Consensus or More 'Rich Chaos'?, in III THE VALUATION OF NATION-
ALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 183 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1975); Kenneth M.
Siegel, Note, The International Law of Compensation for Expropriation and International
Debt: A Dangerous Uncertainty, 8 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 223 (1985). For a
suggestion that the "prompt, adequate, and effective" standard was never a rule of customary
international law, see Oscar Schachter, Compensation for Expropriation, 78 AM. J. INT'L L.
121 (1984).
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More recently, the collapse of the Soviet Union has placed the
Western industrialized states in a stronger position in terms of foreign
direct investment. Increasingly, they have sought to protect their in-
vestments through the negotiation, with individual non-industrialized
states, of bilateral investment treaties providing for levels of compensa-
tion higher than that available under customary international law. It is
possible that the proliferation of these treaties will return the customary
standard to "prompt, adequate, and effective compensation."'140 However,
such a change would once more demonstrate the qualifying effect of the
principle of territorial jurisdiction because these treaties would, in effect,
allow Western industrialized states to shift the locus of the behavior
with greatest legal relevance to this rule outside the territories of indi-
vidual non-industrialized states. In other words, the conclusion of an
investment treaty moves the behavior which is of greatest legal rele-
vance to the standard of compensation from the post-expropriation to the
pre-investment phase, before the investment in question has been com-
mitted to the territorial jurisdiction of any particular non-industrialized
state. 141
B. Boundary Rules
Boundary rules differ from internal rules in that they relate to issues
arising at the intersection of a state's territorial jurisdiction with an
international or internationalized zone. A good example of a boundary
rule is the rule concerning the breadth of the territorial sea. In boundary
rule situations, a state which is in geographic proximity to the area
where the rule is to be applied will usually be in a more powerful
position than states which are more distant. This variation in power
results because the ability to project power derived from some sources,
especially military capabilities, is at least partly dependent on geograph-
ic proximity. 42 The advantage held by geographically proximate states
in boundary rule situations may explain the extension of the breadth of
140. See Davis R. Robinson, Expropriation in the Restatement (Revised), 78 AM. J.
INT'L L. 176, 177-78 (1984); see also RICHARD B. LILLICH & BURNS H. WESTON, INTERNA-
TIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR SETTLEMENT BY LUMP SUM AGREEMENTS 34-43 (1975) (regarding
the analogous situation of lump sum agreements). But see Amerasinghe, supra note 139, at
30; Dolzer, supra note 139, at 565-68; Schachter, supra note 139, at 126-27.
141. If a shift to a higher customary standard is occurring, it may also be at least partly
the result of decisions of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. See Patrick M. Norton, A
Law of the Future or a Law of the Past? Modern Tribunals and the International Law of
Expropriation, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 474, 482-86, 505 (1991). If this is the case, the fact that
the Tribunal was set up primarily to facilitate the release of frozen Iranian assets in the
United States may support the argument which is being advanced here.
142. Power derived from other sources, such as wealth, travels very well.
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the territorial sea to twelve nautical miles in the face of strong opposi-
tion by powerful maritime states, in particular the United States, the
United Kingdom, and Japan. 4 3 It may also explain why a relatively
weak state such as Iceland was able to play such a decisive role in the
development of new customary rules governing coastal fisheries.'"
Geographic proximity should be particularly advantageous in relation to
rules based on continuing economic activity, such as fishing.
C. External Rules
External rules involve restrictions which states seek to impose on
the freedom of other states to act within those other states' own territo-
ries. In these situations the states seeking to impose the restrictions are
at a power disadvantage because they do not have territorial jurisdiction,
which has a crippling effect on their ability to change behavior patterns
so as to create new rules or modify old ones. International human rights
provide a good example of this effect. Driven in part by applications of
power derived from moral authority, states have either participated or
acquiesced in the creation of a multitude of rules concerning internation-
al human rights. Many states have consented to the application of treaty-
based review and individual petition procedures. However, apart from a
few small but nonetheless significant developments, such as the estab-
lishment of United Nations special rapporteurs on several topics, mecha-
nisms to facilitate the application of international human rights rules
within the territorial jurisdictions of nonconsenting states have not been
put in place. 45 The ability of nonconsenting states to control behavioral
patterns within their own territorial jurisdictions is a formidable barrier
to those who seek to change that behavior and thus create rules of
customary international law which provide effective protection to all
human beings.
As this discussion of internal, boundary, and external rules has
shown, the principle of territorial jurisdiction qualifies the application of
state power in the process of customary international law. In some
143. Legitimacy, of the general variety described by FRANCK, supra note 40, may also
have played a role here, in that a coastal state's claim to control over the harvesting of
fisheries, the exploitation of seabed minerals and the prevention of pollution in the area
involved would seem more legitimate than the claims of distant states. On the opposition of
the powerful maritime states to this rule, see discussion infra note 182 and accompanying
text.
144. See, e.g., Fisheries Jurisdiction (Gr. Brit. and N. Ir. v. Ice.) 1974 I.C.J. 3 (July 25);
see generally WILLIAM T. BURKE, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FIsHERIEs 1-24
(1994); 1 D.P. O'CONNELL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 510-81 (1982).
145. See generally discussion supra part I.B.
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situations it goes so far as to render weak and ineffective those states
which are normally regarded as quite powerful.
V. CUSTOM, POWER, AND THE PRINCIPLE OF PERSONALITY
in order for an individual or entity to be able to hold rights and be
subject to obligations within a particular legal system, that individual or
entity must have legal personality. In addition, certain individuals or
entities within that legal system will, depending on their particular
character, also be entitled to hold such rights and be subject to such
obligations. Legal personality, like territorial jurisdiction, is not only
something which can be objectively determined, it is also a requirement,
and, in some cases, an entitlement. For this reason it may be considered
a structural principle of international law.' 46
Different degrees of legal personality may exist within any given
legal system. However, an individual or entity with full legal personality
is capable of holding as many rights and being subject to as many
obligations as any other individual or entity within that legal system. In
a legal system in which the same individuals or entities are both creators
and subjects of the law, having full legal personality means that the
individual or entity in question is formally entitled to participate in the
relevant processes of law creation to the same extent as any other indi-
vidual or entity.1 47 By extension, in the international legal system, only
those individuals or entities that have international legal personality are
entitled to participate in the process of customary international law, and
only those individuals or entities that have full international legal per-
sonality are entitled to participate fully in that process. 
48
In the state-centric international legal system, states are the only
holders of full international legal personality. In principle, all states have
the same degree of legal personality, and in that sense all states are
formally equal. Thus, all states, from the weakest to the most powerful,
are equally entitled to participate in the process of customary interna-
tional law.1
49
146. For a discussion of territorial jurisdiction as a structural principle of international
law, see supra note 133.
147. See discussion of formal equality supra notes 8-16 and accompanying text.
148. Individuals and entities which do not have international legal personality do engage
in activities which are relevant to the process. Judges and scholars, for instance, play an
important role in identifying rules and exposing and analyzing legally relevant behavior.
However, only holders of legal personality are able to engage directly in legally relevant
behavior, which is then weighed to determine the existence and content of particular custom-
ary rules.
149. See discussion supra notes 8-16 and accompanying text.
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This equal right to participate in the customary process immediately
acts to qualify the application of state power, as the supporting and
opposing behavior of less powerful states is weighed together with that
of more powerful states when determining the existence and content of
particular customary rules. Therefore, large numbers of less powerful
states behaving in unison can sometimes "outweigh" smaller numbers of
more powerful states.
Such a numerical imbalance existed when the rule concerning the
twelve-mile territorial sea developed: the powerful maritime states were
so vastly outnumbered by weaker states that opposition by the former
failed to prevent the development of the new rule.' 50 Similarly, attempts
by Western industrialized states to prevent a change in the standard of
compensation required for expropriation were ineffective, at least partly,
because of the large number of less powerful states which supported that
change. 51
One of the best examples of a customary rule which developed
because of a numerical advantage on the part of less powerful states is
the right of self-determination in the context of decolonization. There,
an ever-growing number of relatively less powerful states was able to
expand the scope of a rule despite the fact that most of the more pow-
erful states were initially opposed to that expansion.
52
This particular qualifying effect of the principle of personality will
be greatest when the behavior responsible for the maintenance, devel-
opment, or change of a rule is the sort of behavior in which less power-
ful states easily engage. Consequently, rules which develop largely or
entirely as a result of statements are more open to the participation of
less powerful states than rules which develop largely or entirely as a
result of acts. The statement-driven nature of the international human
rights movement thus partly explains the influential role which less
powerful states have played in developing customary rules in that
area. 1
53
Another qualifying effect of the principle of personality appears in
the context of recognition. Recognition is the process whereby states
formally acknowledge that other entities are states, thereby according
them full international legal personality.'TM Unrecognized states may be
150. See discussion infra part VII.B.
151. See discussion supra pp. 151-53.
152. See generally EYASSU GAYIM, THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION 36-39
(1990); UMOZURIKE 0. UMOZURIKE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1972);
Clyde Eagleton, Self-Determination in the United Nations, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 88 (1953).
153. See discussion supra part I.B.
154. States will sometimes also recognize new governments. See generally Jochen A.
Frowein, Recognition, in 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW "340 (Rudolf
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able to participate in the international legal system, but not to the same
extent as recognized states. Among other things, unrecognized states are
generally not admitted to international organizations, and if they are
admitted they are usually not allowed to participate fully. 155 This exclu-
sion limits or prevents them from contributing to the negotiation and
adoption of resolutions and declarations. Moreover, unrecognized states
generally do not have diplomatic representation in other states, meaning
that their position with respect to the maintenance, development, and
change of particular customary rules may not always be clear. Therefore,
their supporting and opposing behavior may not' be weighed alongside
that of other states.
However, notwithstanding their partial exclusion from the interna-
tional legal system, unrecognized states still have rights and are subject
to obligations under international law. 156 Thus, they are able to partici-
pate in the customary process in any situation in which they are not
restricted by their lack of diplomatic representation or by the refusal of
other states to engage in cooperative behavior. Their acts and statements
remain at least potentially relevant, but what is in effect their lack of
full international legal personality, stemming from the lack of recogni-
tion, limits their opportunities to participate, and thus qualifies the appli-
cation of power, in the process of customary international law.
157
The principle of personality completely prevents most non-state
actors from participating directly in the customary process. For instance,
corporations are some of the most powerful international actors, but
because they have, at best, only limited international legal personality,
they are incapable of participating in the process of customary interna-
tional law, at least in terms of being able to represent themselves.
158
Similarly, although assertions abound to the effect that individual human
beings have limited international legal personality (for example, with
Bernhardt ed., 1987); CRAWFORD, supra note 132, at 10-25 (discussing recognition of states).
However, to the degree that this article considers recognition, it confines itself to the recogni-
tion of states.
155. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2024, U.N. GAOR 4th Comm., 20th Sess., Agenda Item 23, at
65-28194, U.N. Doe. A/L.466 (1965) (regarding the refusal to admit Rhodesia to the United
Nations); G.A. Res. 3237, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., 2296th plen. mtg., at 74-32548, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/3237 (1974) (regarding the granting of observer status in the General Assembly to the
Palestine Liberation Organization).
156. See generally OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 27, at 197-203.
157. A similar situation exists with respect to new states. See discussion supra note 121.
158. See generally supra note 4; see also A.A. Fatouros, National Legal Persons in
International Law, in 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 299 (Rudolf
Bernhardt ed., 1987); D. Kokkini-Iatridou & P.J.I.M. de Waart, Foreign Investments in
Developing Countries - Legal Personality of Multinationals in International Law, 14 NETH.
Y.B. INT'L L. 87 (1983).
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respect to international human rights), and although individuals can be
held responsible under international law for certain crimes, individuals
remain unable to participate directly in the process of customary interna-
tional law. 5 9
To the degree that individuals and corporations play a role in the
process of customary international law, they do so through the mecha-
nism of diplomatic protection. Diplomatic protection means that for the
purposes of international claims, the rights of an individual or corpora-
tion are assimilated to the rights of the state of which that individual or
corporation holds nationality.' 6 Consequently, states are considered to
have obligations to other states concerning the treatment of those other
states' nationals.' 61 Most of the international legal obligations which
states have to individuals and corporations arise through the concept of
diplomatic protection vis-as-vis another state. 62
The link between diplomatic protection and legal personality is a
strong one. In international law the individuals and corporations which
benefit from diplomatic protection are viewed as component parts of
their state's personality. Consequently, they not only share in that per-
sonality but also act as extensions of it. The involvement of nationals in
159. See generally supra note 4. For a developed assertion of the international legal
personality of individuals in the human rights context, see H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1950). On individual criminal responsibility in international law,
see Resolution Establishing an International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Respon-
sible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. SCOR, 32d Sess., 3217th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827
(1993); Resolution Establishing the International Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N. SCOR, 33d
Sess., 3453 mtg. at 2, U.N. Doe. S/RES/955 (1994); I.LC. Draft Statute for an International
Criminal Court, International Law Commission, 46th Sess., at 43-161, UN Doc. A/49/10
(1994); and see generally 1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1986).
160. See Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2, at 12 (Aug.
30); Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway, 1939 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 76, at 16 (Feb. 28). See
generally BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 90, at 480-94;
IGNAZ SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN, CORPORATIONS IN AND UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 7-i2
(1987).
161. It may be argued that nationality is not part of international law because it is open
to any state to grant nationality as it chooses. But although the choice of whether to grant
nationality is within the state's reserved domain, see, e.g., Nationality Decrees in Tunis and
Morocco, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 4, at 24 (Feb. 7); Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955
I.C.J. 4 at 20 (Apr. 6), whether a grant of nationality is valid for the purposes of diplomatic
protection has long been treated as a question of international law. See Nottebohm Case,
supra, at 20-21; Mergd Claim, 22 I.L.R. 443, 454 (Ital.-U.S. Conciliation Comm'n June 10,
1955); Iran v. U.S., Case No. A/18, 5 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 251, 259-66 (Apr. 6, 1984).
162. For the classic expression of this distinction see Barcelona Traction, Light and
Power Co. (BeIg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5). See generally RUTH DONNER, THE
REGULATION OF NATIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1994) (discussing nationality
of claims). There are only a few exceptional cases, involving protected persons and alien
members of a state's armed forces or merchant marine, where a state may provide diplomatic
protection to non-nationals.
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a particular area or activity may allow states to participate in the process
of customary international law in a way, or to an extent, that they would
otherwise be unable to do. This is because only those international legal
personalities to which obligations of international law are owed are
entitled to bring claims under international law, and claims are an
important form of state behavior in the customary process.'63
The involvement of nationals thus enables states to participate more
effectively in the process of customary international law by giving them
opportunities to make specific claims with respect to certain issues and
to make those claims with greater effect than would otherwise be the
case. Moreover, behavior which supports or opposes existing, emerging
or potential rules may be accorded more weight in the customary pro-
cess if it is engaged in for the purposes of supporting or opposing a
legal claim. 6' For instance, the presence of nationals may allow states to
engage in legal countermeasures, which may be more effective in con-
tributing to the process of customary international law than similar, but
illegal acts, engaged in in the absence of nationals.
One example of this phenomenon occurred with respect to the rule
concerning compensation for expropriation. The fact that most of the
affected corporations were incorporated in Western industrialized states
enabled those states to be more involved in the customary process with
respect. to this rule than would otherwise have been possible. This
opportunity for increased involvement was particularly important given
that, from the perspective of the industrialized states, this rule was an
external rule. That is, the industrialized states were already at a disad-
vantage because the preponderance of behavior relevant to this rule
occurred within the territorial jurisdictions of non-industrialized states. 65
The principle of personality, operating in the context of diplomatic
protection, thus provided a qualifying effect which at least partly coun-
teracted the qualifying effect of the principle of territorial jurisdiction,
and did so in favor of the industrialized states. The qualifying effects of
different rules and principles will often work against each other, making
163. See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949
I.C.J. 174, 181-82 (Apr. 11) (advisory opinion); see also discussion supra part III.A-B. There
are at least two differences between claims made by a state on its own behalf and claims
involving diplomatic protection. The former, with the exception of claims involving activities
in the territory of foreign states and for which the state is not entitled to immunity from
foreign courts, may be made without having to establish a genuine link of nationality and
without having to exhaust local remedies.
164. For an argument that only such behavior as supports or opposes claims to rights
constitutes state practice for the purposes of customary international law, see Weisburd, supra
note 32.
165. See discussion supra part IV.C.
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it more difficult to assess their significance within the international
political system.
Another example of the ability of the principle of personality to
improve the efficacy of states' involvement in the customary process
involves boundary rules."6 For example, in the development of the rule
concerning the twelve-mile territorial sea, the activities of merchant
vessels flagged by the powerful maritime states in the various zones of
contested jurisdiction enabled those states to be more involved in re-
sisting the development of that rule than would otherwise have been
possible. This opportunity for increased involvement was particularly
important because many of the disputed areas were located at some
distance from the powerful maritime states' own territories. In effect, the
principle of personality here served to extend a part of those states'
"territorial" jurisdictions - their merchant vessels - to those distant,
disputed areas. However, the presence of those vessels enabled coastal
states to participate more effectively in the customary process as well,
by arresting foreign vessels rather than just making claims to extended
territorial waters.
The development of the rule of restrictive state immunity, on the
other hand, involved an effort to distinguish between different aspects of
a state's international legal personality, namely between the state acting
as a state and the state acting as a private party. Although those parts of
the state which normally acted as private parties were often distinguish-
able from the state as such by the fact that they had separate legal
personality in the state's own national legal system, incorporation also
conferred nationality, thus allowing the state to participate to an in-
creased degree in the customary process, in a manner highly analogous
to the compensation-for-expropriation example.' 67 This increased ability
to participate was particularly important for socialist and non-industrial-
ized states for which restrictive immunity was generally an external rule.
The principle of personality thus allows states to engage in behavior
with respect to existing, emerging, or potential customary rules in situa-
tions where, without the principle of personality, their ability to do so
would be greatly limited. In this way, the principle of personality, like
the principle of jurisdiction, can clearly qualify the application of state
power in the process of customary international law.
166. See discussion supra part IV.B.
167. See discussion supra pp. 159-60.
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VI. CUSTOM, POWER, AND THE PRINCIPLE OF RECIPROCITY
One of the concepts normally considered fundamental to the idea of
law is that the law of any society must apply equally to all its members.
In national legal systems this concept can be understood in at least two
ways. First, it is possible to understand law as being imposed from
above by the state or sovereign and generally applicable to all citi-
zens. 168 Secondly, it is possible to understand law as a multitude of
bilateral relationships between individual people or between individuals
and the state.
169
In international society there is no overarching sovereign, which
means that international law is best understood as a multitude of bilat-
eral relationships between states. Since there is no overarching sover-
eign, no part of this law necessarily has to apply to any one state, nor
does this law have to apply in the same way to all states; that is, it does
not need to be generalized. Instead, the application of any particular rule
of international law to a state is usually regarded as being dependent on
its consent, which may be either express or inferred. 70 This consent
operates bilaterally, as can be seen in the requirement of consent by
states parties to reservations to multilateral treaties,'"' and in the exis-
tence of regional, or special customary international law.'72
Fundamental to bilateralism is the concept of reciprocity: the idea
that bilateral relationships between at least formally equal parties are not
168. See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED, 18-37 (Wilfrid
E. Rumble ed., 1995); A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE
CONSTITUTION 70-76 (10th ed. 1959).
169. See Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning (Part Two), 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1916-17).
170. See discussion supra notes 5, 15 and accompanying text.
171. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 20, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969). This requirement is also part of customary
international law. See ARNOLD MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 158-77 (1961).
172. On regional, or special customary international law, see citations supra note I. It
may appear that this bilateralist understanding of international law is incompatible with the
existence of generally applicable rules, especially those virtually immutable principles which
structure the international legal system. However, if a bilateral legal relationship with respect
to any particular rule is multiplied so that similar relationships with respect to the same rule
exist between all states, the rule becomes general in application. Furthermore, the bilateral
relationships which make up any general rule do not exist in isolation. The customary process
adds weight to, and therefore increases the resistance to change of, the legal rule which
grounds the various bilateral legal relationships. The process, and the behavior which drives
the process, are general in scope; the bilateral relationships which connect rights with
obligations with respect to rules are not. To take an extreme example: an erga omnes rule can
be thought of as a rule which has been grounded by bilateral legal relationships between all
states and as a rule which, if violated, justifies a response by the rights holder at the end of
any of the many bilateral ties to the violating state which relate to that particular rule.
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unidirectional, but necessarily involve at least some element of quid pro
quo.173 This broad social concept of reciprocity, which states apply on
the basis of either short- or long-term considerations of self-interest,
may be responsible for a great deal of inter-state cooperation or ex-
change, outside or in addition to any international legal obligations) 74
However, this general concept also finds expression in a structural
principle of international law, whereby in the context of general custom-
ary international law any state claiming a right under that law has to
accord all other states the same right. 75 Reciprocity is therefore funda-
mental to the process of customary international law; it allows for the
generalization of rules in response to state behavior, which in turn
promotes the maximization of the universalized public interest.
76
Reciprocity also operates as an important constraint on the behavior
of states with respect to existing, emerging, or potential rules of custom-
ary international law. For instance, when a state behaves in support of
an emerging or potential rule of customary international law, as the
United States did in 1945 when it issued the Truman Proclamation on
the Continental Shelf,177 it does so knowing that any rule which results
must apply and be available equally to all other states. 178 Were the state
to refuse to accept generalization of the rule, its statements and actions
would carry little weight as supporting behavior. Its refusal to support
generalization might, in fact, have the opposite effect by demonstrating
the state's opposition to the rule. The same analysis could be made with
respect to existing customary rules: support for a rule constitutes accep-
tance of its general applicability. A state will therefore only behave in
173. In some instances however, such as with respect to some unequal treaties, the quid
might be considerably smaller than the quo. In addition, it may frequently be the case that
reciprocity does not occur in the same, discrete situation, but is provided at another time, in
another "transaction." See discussion of Keohane's "specific" and "diffuse" forms of reciproc-
ity, supra note 76.
174. See generally Keohane, Reciprocity in International Relations, supra note 76.
175. This distinction between the general, social concept, and the legal principle of
reciprocity is similar to that made by Michel Virally between "la rdciprocitd formelle" and "la
r6ciprocitd rdelle." See Michel Virally, Le principe de r6ciprocit6 dans le droit international
contemporain, 122 R.C.A.D.I. 1, 29-34 (1967-III); accord Bruno Simma, Reciprocity, in 7
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 400 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1984). For an
explanation of the general concept of reciprocity from the perspective of general legal theory,
as the source of most obligations, see LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 19-27 (rev. ed.
1969).
176. See discussion supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
177. Policy of the United States With Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil
and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, Proclamation No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 67 (1943-48),
reprinted in 40 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 45 (1946).
178. The explicit recognition of reciprocity found in the Truman Proclamation - and the
fact that the claim was to jurisdiction, and not to the right to acquire jurisdiction through
occupation - explains, in large part, its rapid acceptance as a rule of customary international
law. See O'CONNELL, supra note 144, at 470-71; Crawford & Viles, supra note 19, at 48.
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support of an existing, emerging, or potential customary rule if it is
prepared to accept the generalization of that rule.
The constraints imposed by the principle of reciprocity on the
application of state power in the customary process are perhaps most
interesting with respect to its effects on persistent objection. Persistent
objection is the term used to describe the option each state has to op-
pose the development of a new rule of customary international law and
to continue opposing that rule once it comes into existence. This con-
tinuing objection, which may be expressed either through actions or
through statements, enables the objecting state to avoid being bound by
the newly developed rule. 79
Reciprocity affects persistent objection in the following way. The
objecting state remains governed by the old rule in its relations with all
other states. As a result of the principle of reciprocity and despite the
existence of the new, generalized rule other states may also claim the
same rights vis-a-vis the objecting state as they were able to claim under
the old rule. However, these other states are governed by the new rule
as among themselves. They are thus able to benefit from the existence
of the new rule without having to share any of those benefits with the
objecting state. There is, in effect, no "free rider" problem, which places
the objecting state at a disadvantage, since it can neither freeze the state
of general customary international law so as to benefit itself nor take
advantage of any benefits the new rule may offer.
In addition, most states are extremely reluctant to recognize the
rights of persistent objectors. State agencies and national courts fre-
quently are unaware of or even ignore the objection.180 There may be
179. See generally Charney, supra note 15; David A. Colson, How Persistent Must the
Persistent Objector Be?, 61 WASH. L. REv. 957 (1986); Ted L. Stein, The Approach of the
Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent Objector in International Law, 26 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 457 (1985). For a judicial statement see Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J.
116, 131 (Dec. 18). The persistent objector doctrine is thus similar to the power of reservation
in treaty law in that both recognize the necessity of state consent. See Julio A. Barberis,
Reflexions sur la coutune internationale, 36 A.F.D.I. 9, 13 (1990). Persistent objection is also
important in terms of its systemic effects. Since states are not only subject to but also creators
of customary international law, see SCELLE, supra note 64, objectors play a dialectic opposi-
tional role, much like an opposition party in a legislature. They draw attention to changes
being made in the law, and to problems associated with those changes, forcing others to
consider their actions and, if they can convince enough other states to join them, blocking or
reversing change.
180. National courts are, in fact, fully entitled to ignore persistent objection. National
courts do not deal in diplomatic relations; they are merely authorized, or have taken upon
themselves, to apply the general standards of international law. When a national court applies
customary international law it may therefore choose to apply that law as general law, thus
precluding the possibility of persistent objection, and not as a series of bilateral legal relation-
ships between states. If the court fails to take into account an exception to the generality of
that law, it is not the court but the state of which the court is but an internal agency which is
responsible vis-6-vis the other, exempted state. The situation is thus similar to that of the
international legal responsibility of federal states for the actions of their constituent units.
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little that a persistent objector can do about such treatment if the rule is
applied within or in close proximity to the territorial jurisdiction of
another state.' If the objecting state is serious about its objection, the
principle of reciprocity requires that it continue to deal with other states
on the basis of the old rule even if those other states are not doing the
same with respect to it. If it does not, it has abandoned its position of
persistent objection. The pressure created in this type of situation may
be substantial. For example, the United States, the United Kingdom, and
Japan eventually abandoned their positions of persistent objection to the
development of a twelve-mile breadth to the territorial sea, at least
partly as a result of coastal fishing and security concerns. 8 2 Although
foreign fishing vessels and spy ships were able to operate just outside
the three-mile limits of the persistently objecting states, the objecting
states' vessels were excluded from those waters within twelve miles of
other states' coastlines. Similarly, even the Soviet Union and other
socialist states eventually accepted, at least in practice, the restrictive
doctrine of state immunity. 3
The reasons for which a national court may ignore persistent objection are many and
varied, although the most important of these may well be a lack of expertise with respect to
questions of international law. Furthermore, in some instances national courts will be prevent-
ed from looking at customary international law and acknowledging persistent objection as a
result of statutory action on the part of national legislatures, as has been the case under the
United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. See, e.g., United Euram Corp. v. U.S.S.R.,
461 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 550 F. Supp. 869
(N.D. Ala. 1982), dismissed on other grounds, 596 F. Supp. 386 (N.D. Ala. 1984) (dismissed
due to the non-retrospective nature of the F.S.I.A).
181. See discussion of the principle of territorial jurisdiction supra part IV.
182. On the development of the twelve-mile territorial sea, see infra part VII.B. For
examples of statements (these from the United Kingdom) attempting to uphold the three-mile
limit see E. Lauterpacht, The Contemporary Practice of the United Kingdom in the Field of
International Law, 9 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 253, 278-79 (1960); E. Lauterpacht, The Contem-
porary Practice of the United Kingdom in the Field of International Law, 7 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 514, 537-42 (1958). Japan adopted a twelve-mile territorial sea in 1977, although it
retained a three-mile limit in those areas adjacent to international straits. See Shunji Yanai &
Kuniaki Asomura, Note, Japan and the Emerging Order of the Sea: Two Maritime Laws of
Japan, 21 JAPAN. ANN. INT'L L. 48, 92 (1977). The Japanese Prime Minister, in introducing
the bill in the Diet, cited increased foreign fishing in the waters around Japan as one of the
reasons for the change in policy. See Shigeru Oda & Hisashi Owada, Annual Review of
Japanese Practice in International Law, 28 JAPAN. ANN. INT'L L. 59, 94 (1985). The United
States abandoned its position, with respect to the claims of other states, in 1983. See Exclu-
sive Economic Zone of the United States of America, Proclamation No. 5030, 3 C.F.R. 22
(1984), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 461, 462 (1983). It adopted a twelve-mile limit of its own in
1988, with a Presidential Proclamation which made explicit reference to national security
interests. See Presidential Proclamation on the Territorial Sea of the United States, Proclama-
tion No. 5928, 3 C.F.R. 547, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 284 (1989). The United Kingdom
abandoned its stance of persistent objection with the approval of the Territorial Sea Act, 1987,
ch. 49 (U.K.). The debates on the bill made reference to fishing interests, security concerns
and the problem of "pirate broadcasting" between three and twelve miles offshore. See
Territorial Sea Bill, 484 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th Ser.) 381-401 (1987).
183. See generally Emanuelli, supra note 137, at 37, 68; Crawford, supra note 138, at
824-31; J.R. Crawford, A Foreign State Immunities Act for Australia?, 8 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L
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Finally, by persistently objecting, the state eventually excludes itself
from the customary process in the area governed by the new rule. The
new rule will become the focus of new interests and correspondingly
new patterns of supporting, ambivalent, and opposing behavior, while
the objecting state remains locked in the past, governed by the old rule,
without any opportunity to influence the continuing development of the
new one.
The principle of reciprocity thus operates to discourage persistent
objection. Some states will oppose an emerging rule in an effort to
prevent it from coming into force. A few will continue to oppose the
new rule even after it comes into force, perhaps hoping to reverse
matters in the early stages before the rule gathers weight. However, no
state, not even the most powerful, persistently objects for an indefinite
period of time. In this way the principle of reciprocity, like the princi-
pies of jurisdiction and personality, has a qualifying effect on the appli-
cation of state power in the process of customary international law.
VII. CUSTOM, POWER, AND THE PRINCIPLE
OF LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION
States are generally considered not to be bound by rules of interna-
tional law to which they have not consented. 84 Consent may therefore
be considered a fundamental principle of international law. However,
although states consent explicitly to treaty obligations through the act of
signature or ratification, they usually do not consent explicitly to rules
of customary international law. Instead, they are held to have consented
to those customary rules to which they have acquiesced.'85
The word consent is not a particularly accurate description of the
role of acquiescence in the customary process because acquiescence
often signifies ambivalence to the rule in question rather than a con-
scious decision to consent on the part of the acquiescing state. Further-
more, the development of new rights or obligations based on acquies-
cence necessarily involves other states in addition to the acquiescing
state. Rights and obligations in international law are never entirely the
creation of a single state's will because they exist between and among
states. 86 All states understand that one state's acquiescence to a cus-
tomary rule may give rise to rights or obligations having the potential to
L. 71, 78-80 (1983); Jill A. Sgro, Comment, China's Stance on Sovereign Immunity: A
Critical Perspective on Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 22 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
101, 124-31 (1983).
184. See generally supra note 5.
185. See supra note 15.
186. See discussion supra notes 168-72 and accompanying text.
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affect all states in some way, either as subjects of corresponding obliga-
tions or as holders of corresponding rights. This shared understanding is
based not so much on consent as it is on the legitimate, or legally
justifiable, expectations of the participants in the customary process as
to the legal relevance and legal effect of a certain type of behavior. 1
8 7
Consequently, acquiescence in this context is more accurately described
as being based on a principle of legitimate expectation rather than'one
of consent, even though legitimate expectation may itself be based on
some earlier, general consent to the process of customary international
law.
88
All rules of international law involve legitimate expectations. Rules
of customary international law involve legitimate expectations because
any change from a voluntary pattern of behavior to a rule of customary
international law involves the transformation and legitimization of
patterns of behavior, around which expectations of a legal character
necessarily develop.1 89 Treaty rules involve legitimate expectations
because they are based on the general customary rule of pacta sunt
servanda, which requires that treaty obligations be upheld in good
faith.19° In short, states expect other states to abide by their treaty obli-
gations. This expectation is legitimate - i.e., legally justifiable -
because states usually behave accordingly and regard their behavior as
having legal relevance.
If the principle of legitimate expectation is of such importance to
international law, it should also be relevant to international institutions
more generally, and in particular to how international institutions are
maintained, developed, and changed. This article has reviewed how re-
gime theorists and institutionalists have tried to explain the growth and
persistence of regimes and other international institutions. Keohane, for
example, has convincingly demonstrated that the international trading
regime, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, was largely the
result of a preponderance of United States power and influence in the
years immediately following the Second.World War.' 9' That conclusion
was, in itself, hardly surprising, and therefore not particularly interest-
ing. What was interesting was that Keohane also demonstrated that the
international trading regime survived far longer than an analysis of
United States hegemony would suggest it should have survived.
187. See discussion of the role of shared understandings in the customary process, supra
pp. 137-45.
188. See discussion supra note 5.
189. See discussion supra part I.C.
190. See generally MCNAIR, supra note 171, 493-505; Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, supra note 171, art. 26.
191. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 69.
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Keohane accounted for this finding by arguing that states sometimes
maintain regimes longer than is necessary to fulfill the initial purpose
for their creation - generally the advancement of a hegemonic state's
power - if those regimes have come to serve other purposes. Such
other purposes could include improving efficiency by removing the need
to deal with situations on a case-by-case basis, and facilitating commu-
nication, negotiation, and the resolution of disputes, not necessarily for
the hegemonic state alone but for other states as well.1
92
The persistence of regimes and other institutions is accentuated by
something which Keohane referred to as "sunk costs," namely the
irretrievable investment of an actor's time and power in creating an
institution. 93 Faced with the loss of this investment, actors will some-
times choose to maintain the institution even if purely utilitarian calcu-
lations, which do not take into account that past investment, do not
justify their doing so.
In international society, the various factors which contribute to the
persistence of institutions may well be exaggerated due to the multitude
of independent actors, meaning -that sustainable institutions cannot
normally be imposed by a single, powerful state but instead require
extensive negotiation and compromise. Agreement on any given issue
may be difficult to achieve once, let alone several times. Cognizant of
the risk of failure associated with inter-state negotiation, states may
sometimes choose to retain an existing institution rather than take the
chances inherent in trying to create a new one. 94 All of these consider-
ations help to explain the remarkable persistence of international insti-
tutions. However, they do so without considering the possible influence
of legal rules and principles on how those institutions are maintained,
developed, and changed.
The principle of legitimate expectation may be as important as the
strictly non-legal factors put forward by Keohane and others in terms of
its ability to explain the persistence of international institutions. More-
over, an explanation for the persistence of international institutions
based on the principle of legitimate expectation is fully compatible with
an understanding of the international system. as largely responsive to
power applications in furtherance of state interest. The principle of
legitimate expectation, unlike other, non-legal factors, is largely external
192. Id. at 243-59.
193. Id. at 102. See also ARTHUR L. STINCHCOMBE, CONSTRUCTING SOCIAL THEORIES
120-21 (1968).
194. See generally YOUNG, supra note 2, at 65-67. Young wrote that "[tihe image of a
dominant state or a hegemon playing the role of lawgiver is severely distorted," id. at 65, and
that "the difficulties of putting together a winning coalition, much less achieving general
consensus, in support of specific alternatives to prevailing institutional arrangements are
notorious." Id. at 203-04.
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to short-term interest calculations and power applications because it is a
highly resistant, structural principle of international law.
The principle of legitimate expectation has its most interesting
effects on the customary process in terms of how it relates to the rela-
tive degrees of resistance to change which different customary rules
have. Earlier in this article it was explained that different customary
rules attract differing degrees of supporting, ambivalent, and opposing
behavior and that as a result, some rules are more resistant to change
than others. 95 The degree of legitimate expectation which states hold
with respect to whether a rule will continue in force is related to the
degree of resistance which that rule has to being changed. If the rule's
resistance to change alters as a result of changes in the relative amounts
of supporting, ambivalent, and opposing behavior it attracts, the degree
of legitimate expectation which states hold with respect to that particular
rule continuing in force will usually change accordingly.
This statement may seem tautological. Indeed, it would be if legiti-
mate expectation concerning the continuing in force of customary rules
were in all cases firmly linked to the relative resistance to change of
those rules. However, legitimate expectation concerning whether a rule
will continue in force occasionally becomes detached from that rule's
resistance to change, which is why it is necessary to distinguish between
the two. It is in these situations, in which the principle of legitimate
expectation has become detached from resistance to change, that the
qualifying effects of that principle on the application of state power in
the customary process are most interesting and most clearly evident.
Legitimate expectation in this context is the measure of what states
consider the weight of a particular rule to be, rather than what the
weight of that rule actually is. States' behavior with respect to rules
depends not on what those rules are but on what states consider those
rules to be. Thus, it is legitimate expectation rather than resistance to
change which accounts for how states behave when they attempt to
contribute to, or impede, the maintenance, development, or change of
rules of customary international law.
Sometimes what most states consider to be rules of customary
international law are not in fact rules at all. In such situations their
mistaken belief in the existence of a customary rule has the same effect
on the application of state power with respect to the development of a
new rule that the resistance to change of an existing rule would normal-
ly have. Consequently, in order for state behavior to create a new cus-
tomary rule it first has to overcome any widely-held mistaken belief in
an existing one. Since a widely-held belief in the existence of a rule
constitutes legitimate expectation, even when that expectation is mis-
guided, the principle of legitimate expectation once again qualifies the
195. See discussion supra part III.D.
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application of state power in the process of customary international law.
In short, by according a resistance to change even to rules which do not
exist it acts to prevent or retard the development of new ones.
A. State Immunity from Jurisdiction
One example of this qualifying effect at work concerns state im-
munity from jurisdiction. It is generally assumed that when the doctrine
of restrictive state immunity from the jurisdiction of foreign courts
became a rule of customary international law in the middle of the twen-
tieth century, it did so by changing a previously existing rule that states
were absolutely immune from jurisdiction.' However, an examination
of the history of state immunity, which is primarily a history of national
court judgments and national legislation, suggests that absolute immuni-
ty was not an established rule. Rather, history suggests that there was no
rule regulating state immunity from jurisdiction prior to restrictive
immunity becoming a rule of customary international law, and that a
mistaken belief in such a preexisting rule served to retard that later
development.
Belgian courts were applying restrictive immunity as early as
1857,197 while Italian courts were doing so in 1886,198 Swiss courts in
1918,'99 and Austrian courts in 1919.20 Argentine 20' and French 2° courts
distinguished between acts jure imperii (of government) and acts jure
gestionis (of a commercial nature) from 1924, Egyptian courts from
196. See, e.g., BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 550
(1991); OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 27, at 355-63; MALCOLM N. SHAW,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 433-40 (3d ed. 1991); Sucharitkul, supra note 137; Trooboff, supra
note 137. For a more cautious approach see Emanuelli, supra note 137.
.197. Judgment of Aug. 13, 1857 (l'ltat du Pdrou v. Kreglinger), Pasicrisie Beige 348
(Belg.).
198. Judgment of July 25, 1886 (Guttidres v. Elmilik), Cass. Firenze, Giur. It. 1 486
(Italy).
199. Judgment of Mar. 13, 1918 (K.k. Osterreich. Finanzministerium v. Dreyfus), 44
Entscheidungen des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts I [BGE] 49 (Switz.).
200. Judgment of Aug. 27, 1919 (Osterreichisch-ungarische Bank v. Ungarische
Regierung), 28 Niemeyers Zeitschrift for Internationales Recht [Niemeyers Z.f.Int.R.] 506
(Aus.).
201. Judgment of Nov. 19, 1924 (Cfa. Introductora de Buenos Aires v. Capitan del
Vapor Cokato), Cdmara Nacional de Apelaciones de la Capital Federal [Fed. Ct. of Appeal of
the Capital] 14 Jurisprudencia Argentina 705 (1924) (Arg.). But cf., Judgment of July 16,
1937 (The Ibaf), CSJN [Supreme Court], 178 Fallos 173 (1937) (Arg.).
202. Judgment of Feb. 12, 1924 (Etat roumain v. Soci&tO A. Pascalet), Trib. Con., Dalloz
260 (Fr.).
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1926,203 Greek courts from 1928,204 Irish courts from 1941,205 and Ger-
man courts from 194 9 .206
During this period, courts in common law states were applying ab-
solute immunity and continued to do so until legislative changes were
introduced during the 1970s and 1980s. In the United Kingdom, for
example, it was not until 1977 that Lord Denning and Justice Shaw
controversially applied restrictive immunity in direct contradiction to
clear precedents in English common law.207 This application of restric-
tive immunity was followed, for the most part, by other English judges
and could have drastically altered the English common law, on this is-
sue. 208 However, before this change could become firmly established,
Parliament passed the State Immunity Act of 197 8,2o9 which confirmed
and solidified the judiciary's changing position.210
In the United States, absolute immunity was firmly entrenched in
the common law.21' However, a practice had developed, and had been
203. Judgment of Nov. 29, 1924 (Borg v. Caisse National d'Epargne Franqaise), Trib.
Civ. Alex., 16 Gazette des Tribunaux Mixtes d'Egypte [Gaz. Tribx. M. d'Egypt] 123; see also
Judgment of Jan. 22, 1930 (Monopole des Tabacs de Turquie v. Rdgie co-intress6e des
Tabacs de Turquie), Cour d'Appel (Appeals Ct.), 20 Gaz. Tribx. M. d'Egypt 145.
204. Soviet Republic (Immunity in Greece) Case, 4 Ann. Dig. 172 (Court of Athens
1928) (Greece); see also Consular Premises Case, 6 Ann. Dig. 338 (Court of Athens 1931)
(Greece).
205. The Ramava, 10 Ann. Dig. 91 (High Ct. 1941) (It.).
206. Das sowjetische Ministerium fUr Aussenhandel (1949) 3 JURISTISCHE RUNDSCHAU
118, Berlin Court of Appeal .(Kammergericht).
207. See Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 16 I.L.M. 471 (1977) (Eng.
C.A.). Precedents included: The Prins Frederik, 3 Brit. Int'l L. Cas. 275 (1965) (Adm. Nov.
17, 1820); De Haber v. Queen of Portugal, 17 Q.B. 171 (1851); The Porto Alexandre, 1920
P.C. 30 (1919); Compania Naviera Vascongada v. S.S. Cristina, 1938 App. Cas. 485, 490
(1938) (judgment of Lord Atkin). It should be noted, however, that before 1977 numerous
English judges had criticised, or at least been hesitant in applying, the doctrine of absolute
immunity. See, most famously, The Charkieh (1873) 3 British Int'l L. Cas. 275, 299 (1965)
(Adm. May 7, 1873) (opinion of Sir Robert Phillimore). Denning and Shaw were also faced
by the somewhat dubious distinction made by the Privy Council in The Philippine Admiral,
where the Council applied the doctrine of restrictive immunity, but only with respect to an
action in rem. The Philippine Admiral v. Wallen Shipping, Ltd., 15 I.L.M. 133 (1976) (H.L.
1975).
208. See I Congreso del Partido, 3 W.L.R. 778 (1977) (opinion of Goff, J.); Planmount
Ltd. v. Republic of Zaire, 64 I.L.R. 268 (1983) (Eng. Q.B. 1980) (opinion of Lloyd, J.); I
Congreso del Partido, 64 I.L.R. 307 (1983) (Eng. H.L. 1981); see generally CHARLES J.
LEWIS, STATE AND DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY 14-29 (3d ed. 1990) (summarizing the English
common law of state immunity).
209. State Immunity Act 1978, ch. 33 (1978), reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1123 (1978).
210. See, e.g., Alcom Ltd. v. Colombia, 22 I.L.M. 1307 (1983) (Eng. Q.B. 1983).
211. Chief Justice Marshall's famous words in Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon estab-
lished a precedent which held for over 150 years:
One sovereign being in no respect amenable to another; and being bound by obli-
gations of the highest character not to degrade the dignity of his nation, by placing
himself or its sovereign rights within the jurisdiction of another, can be supposed to
enter a foreign territory only under an express license, or in the confidence that the
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accepted as law, whereby "suggestions" from the Department of State as
to the lack of immunity in specific cases were followed by the courts.21 2
Then, in 1952, the Department of State announced in the so-called "Tate
Letter" that as a matter of policy it would no longer favor claims of
immunity for foreign governments with respect to commercial transac-
tions.213 This statement guided the courts-in subsequent cases where the
Department -refused to make "suggestions." In these situations, the
courts predictably held that foreign states were not entitled to immunity
when engaged in activities of an essentially commercial nature.
2 14
Executive action as expressed in the Tate Letter was followed
twenty-four years later by legislative action in the form of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976.215 After passage of this Act, the
immunities belonging to his independent sovereign station, though not expressly
stipulated, are reserved by implication, and will be extended to him.
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812). Although, as Ian Sinclair has noted, this "judgment is in
no way inconsistent with the theory that immunity may extend only so far as to secure the
protection of the 'sovereign rights' exercisable by a foreign sovereign," the United States
Supreme Court chose to apply this precedent in an absolutist manner. Ian Sinclair, The Law of
Sovereign Immunity: Recent Developments, 167 R.C.A.D.I. 113, 122 (1980-Il). In 1926 the
Court wrote that the principles set out in the.Schooner Exchange were "applicable alike to all
ships held and used by a government for a public purpose" including, in this instance, a gov-
ernment-owned merchant vessel used to transport olive oil for commercial sale. Berizzi Bros.
v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 574 (1926).
212. See, e.g., Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S.'578 (1943); Republic of Mexico v.
Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
213. Sovereign Immunity, 6 Whiteman DIGEST § 20, at 569-7; see William W. Bishop,
Jr., New United States Policy Limiting Sovereign Immunity, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 93 (1953);
Leo M. Drachsler, Some Observations on the Current Status of the Tate Letter, 54 AM. J.
INT'L L. 790 (1960).
However, the executive did not always adhere strictly to its policy as expressed in the
Tate Letter. For example, in the 1970 case of Isbrandtsen Tankers, the United States Court of
Appeals stated that it would have applied the doctrine of restrictive immunity had it not been
for the provision, by the State Department, of a written "suggestion" of immunity. Isbrandtsen
Tankers v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985
(1971). Similarly, the United States continued throughout the 1950s to claim immunity
whenever it was sued in foreign courts. In the 1960s the United States restricted its claims of
absolute immunity to those situations in which it was sued in the courts of states adhering to
that doctrine. Only in the 1970s did it stop claiming absolute immunity altogether. See
Trooboff, supra, note 137, at 270.
214. See, e.g., National City Bank of New York v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356
(1955); Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336
F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964); Ocean Transport Co. v. Government of the Republic of the Ivory
Coast, 269 F. Supp. 703 (E.D. La. 1967).
215. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (F.S.I.A.), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (1976),
reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 1388 (1976). For a review of the key provisions of the F.S.I.A., as well
as a brief outline of the history of state immunity in the United States see Monroe Leigh,
Address, in Proceedings of the 1978 International Law Association Conference on State
Immunity: Law and Practice in the United States and Europe, 7. See also Robert. B. von
Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 33
(1978); Charles N. Brower et al., The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 in Practice,
73 AM. J. INT'L L. 200 (1979).
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Department of State largely discontinued its practice of making "sug-
gestions" of immunity, thus leaving this question for the courts to
decide on the basis of the Act.216
Developments similar to those in the United Kingdom and the
United States took place in Singapore,217 Pakistan,218 South Africa,219
Canada,220 and Australia.
221
The difference between common law and civil law jurisdictions in
terms of their willingness to incorporate the doctrine of restrictive state
immunity into national law can be explained on at least three different
grounds. First, common law courts remained bound by the doctrine of
crown immunity ("sovereign immunity" in the United States) long after
civil law courts began to distinguish between immune and non-immune
acts of their own sovereigns. Second, courts in common law systems felt
216. But see, e.g., United States v. County of Arlington, 669 F.2d 925 (4th Cir. 1982). In
this case the Department of State had taken the view that Section 1610(a)(4)(B) of the
F.S.I.A. applied and that the property of the foreign state in question was therefore immune
from execution. The Court noted that although the views of the Department were not conclu-
sive, they carried great weight and could only be rejected if deemed to be unreasonable. Id. at
934.
217. State Immunity Act (1979) (Sing.), reprinted in, MATERIALS ON JURISDICTIONAL
IMMUNITIES OF STATES AND THEIR PROPERTY, at 28, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/20 (1982)
[hereinafter MATERIALS ON JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES].
218. State Immunity Ordinance (1981) (Pak.), reprinted in MATERIALS ON JURISDIC-
TIONAL IMMUNITIES, supra note 217, at 20.
219. Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (1981) (S. Aft.), reprinted in MATERIALS ON
JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES, supra note 217, at 34; see also W. Bray & M. Beukes, Recent
Trends in the Development of State Immunity in South African Law, 7 S. AFR. Y.B. INT'L L.
13 (1981); Gerhard Erasmus, Proceedings Against Foreign States - The South African
Foreign States Immunities Act, 8 S. AIR. Y.B. INT'L L. 92 (1982).
220. Act to Provide for State Immunity in Canadian Courts (1982), reprinted in 21
I.L.M. 798 (1982). The doctrine of absolute immunity had been established as common law
by the Supreme Court of Canada in Dessaules v. Poland, 4 D.L.R. 1 (1944) (Can.). However,
in Flota Maritima Browning de Cuba S.A. v. S.S. Canadian Conqueror, 1962 S.C.R. 598
(Can.), that same court left the matter open, while leaning towards a restrictive approach. The
decision in Congo v. Venne, 1971 S.C.R. 997 (Can.), was similarly inconclusive. In more
recent years the doctrine of restrictive immunity was applied by several lower courts. See
Zodiak Int'l Prods. v. Polish People's Republic, 81 D.L.R. (3d) 656 (Que. C.A.)(1977); Smith
v. Canadian Javelin, 68 D.L.R. (3d) 428 (Ont. H.C.)(1976). For comment on the Act, see H.L.
Molot & M.L. Jewett, The State Immunity Act of Canada, 20 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 79 (1982).
It is also interesting to note that section 43(7)(c) of the Federal Court Act stated that: "No
action in rem may be commenced in Canada against any ship owned or operated by a
sovereign power other than Canada, or any cargo laden thereon, with respect to any claim
where, at the time the claim arose or the action is commenced, such ship was being used
exclusively for non-commercial governmental purposes." Federal Court Act, ch. 1, 1970-1972
R.S.C. 113-14 (Can.). Thus, in 1970, the new Federal Court Act implicitly granted jurisdic-
tion to the Federal Court over foreign state-owned ships used for non-governmental, commer-
cial activities.
221. Foreign States Immunities Act 1985, reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 715 (1986); see also
AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, REPORT No. 24: FOREIGN STATE IMMUNITY (1984)
(providing background to the development of the Australian Act and a comprehensive survey
of the international law of state immunity).
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bound by the doctrine of stare decisis not to abandon their earlier
applications of absolute immunity. Third, common law states had a less
acute interest in the development of a rule of restrictive immunity than
most civil law states. The common law states were either large, such as
the United States, or part of the former British Empire - with its inter-
nal cohesiveness and historic, political, and commercial ties. By con-
trast, the small civil law trading states of Europe, such as the Nether-
lands, Belgium, and Italy, were dependent to a far greater extent on
trade between fully sovereign states.
However, it seems that the principle of legitimate expectation may
also have played an important role. In every common law jurisdiction,
absolute immunity was viewed as the previously applicable rule of
customary international law. Consequently, the changes in national laws
were regarded as responses to a change in the existing customary rule
rather than as responses to the development of a new rule, even though
it is apparent, from the earlier developments in civil law jurisdictions,
that a customary rule of absolute state immunity could not have existed
at any date after the very early twentieth century.222 This widely-held
mistaken belief would seem to have been at least partly responsible for
retarding the acceptance of the doctrine, of restrictive immunity in com-
mon law states and therefore the development of restrictive immunity as
a new rule of customary international law.
B. The Breadth of the Territorial Sea
Another particularly good example of the principle of legitimate
expectation at work through a mistaken belief in a preexisting rule
concerns the breadth of the territorial sea. Until the early 1980s, the
behavior of states was sufficiently inconsistent to prevent any particular
breadth from becoming a rule of customary international law. However,
faced with a variety of claims in excess of three nautical miles, as well
as improvements in ordinance which extended the breadth covered by
the "cannon-shot rule," maritime states and scholars from maritime
states succeeded in convincing themselves, and others, that a customary
rule already existed, to the effect that the breadth of the territorial sea
was in fact three miles. This mistaken belief, in turn, imposed a serious
restraint on the development of a new, more extensive rule.
Disagreement as to the breadth of the territorialsea had existed for
centuries. For instance, although in 1782 Ferdinando Galiani asserted
222. See generally supra notes 197-206.
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that the three-mile limit was part of international law,223 Norway, Swe-
den, and Finland had been claiming a four-mile limit since earlier in the
eighteenth century.224 In 1794, the United States Congress felt it neces-
sary to enact the Neutrality Act to grant jurisdiction to the district courts
to hear cases arising out of the capture of foreign ships "within the
waters of the United States, or within a marine league [three miles] of
the coasts or shores thereof.''225 The nineteenth and very early twentieth
centuries saw a number of states claim three-mile limits, 226 although
most continental European states continued to regard the breadth of the
territorial sea as being determined solely on the basis of the "cannon-
shot rule."227 Then, in 1921, the Soviet Union became the first state to
assert a twelve-mile limit, although it did so only with respect to fishing
rights along its arctic coast and in the White Sea.228
Faced with this variety of claims and improvements in ordinance,
maritime states and scholars from maritime states argued that a rule of
customary international law, to the effect that the breadth of the territo-
rial sea was three miles, already regulated the issue. For example, in
1928 Thomas Baty wrote that:
[D]uring the nineteenth century it [the three-mile limit] has been
virtually unchallenged in practice, and it has been asserted as law
223. FERDINANDO GALIANI, DEi DOVERI DEI PRINCIPI NEUTRALI (2d ed. 1942).
224. Sweden did so in 1779, Norway did so before that date. See Daniel Bardonnet, La
largeur de la mer territoriale, 66 R.G.D.I.P. 34, 67 n.121 (1962).
225. Neutrality Act of 1794, 1 Stat. 369 (1794), 18 U.S.C. §§ 960-62 (1982) (emphasis
added).
226. These states included the United Kingdom (1800-1805), Austria (1846), Chile
(1855), Brazil (1859), Japan (1870), Argentina (1871), Ecuador (1889), The Netherlands
(1889), Liberia (1902), and Mexico (1902). See BROWNLIE, supra note 90, at 188 n.47;
O'CONNELL, supra note 144, at 131-32.
227. See generally O'CONNELL, supra note 144, at 134-35, 151-53. In the years
immediately preceding World War 1, France, Italy, Russia, Spain, and the Ottoman Empire all
claimed the right to exercise jurisdiction up to any distance from shore within the actual range
of artillery, as long as the exercise of that jurisdiction was reasonable for the control of
specific activities such as fishing or smuggling. See R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V. LOWE, THE
LAW OF THE SEA 66 (rev. ed. 1988). The confusion as to the breadth of the territorial sea was
reflected in the writing of legal scholars. O'Connell notes that:
during the critical period from 1876 to 1914, thirty-three jurists believed that the
territorial sea expanded with the evolving range of artillery; twenty-six believed
that state practice had established it at three miles; five proposed other fixed limits;
five argued for different limits for different purposes; eight ambiguously referred to
both the three-mile limit and the cannon-shot; and seven thought that there was no
consensus on the matter.
O'CONNELL, supra note 144, at 153-54.
228. O'CONNELL, supra note 144, at 155. Legislation implementing a twelve-mile limit
along all parts of the Soviet Union's coastline did not follow until 1960. Id.
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by the most eminent statesmen and in the most formal documents.
Few if any countries have ever formally contradicted it during that
period, and none has ever successfully enforced a different rule on
unwilling contemporaries.229
Many other scholars, and groups of scholars. expressed similar views
during the inter-war period.23 °
In 1930, state representatives met at The Hague to codify three areas
of customary law, including the breadth of the territorial sea. 231 They
grouped themselves in three different camps. Some advocated a three-
mile limit without a contiguous zone; others wanted a three-mile limit
with a contiguous zone; and a third group sought a territorial sea, either
with or without a contiguous zone, with a breadth in excess of three
miles. In the end, a narrow majority supported the three-mile limit, but
a two-thirds majority was needed to carry the proposal forward.232
Following the 1930 Hague Conference, jurists "defected en masse
from the three-mile principle, while being increasingly unable to agree
229. Thomas Baty, The Three Mile Limit, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 503, 503 (1928).
230. See, e.g., CHARLES G. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 250-52 (1924); PHILIP C.
JESSUP, THE LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDICTION 62-66 (1927); C.J.
Colombos, Territorial Waters, 9 TRANSACTIONS GROTIUS SOC'Y 89, 96 (1924); Martin
Conboy, The Territorial Sea, 2 CAN. BAR REV. 8, 18 (1924); Baron de Stadl-Holstein, Le
Rigime Scandinave des Eaux Littorales, 3(5) REVUE DE DROIT INT'L & DROIT COMPARI
[R.D.I.D.C.] 630 (1924) (asserting that the Scandinavian four-mile limit was an exception to
an otherwise general rule). For contemporaneous criticism of the three-mile limit see Philip
M. Brown, The Marginal Sea, 17 AM. J. INT'L L. 89 (1923). In 1926, the International Law
Association accepted the three-mile limit, Draft Convention: Laws of Maritime Jurisdiction in
Time of Peace, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASS'N, REPORT OF THE 34TH CONFERENCE 101, art.
5 (1926), as did the American Institute of International Law, 20 AM. J. INT'L L. SuPP. 136,
136-37, Art. I (1926), and the Deutsche Gesellschaft flur V6lkerrecht (Kilstenmeerentwurf,
Resolution of 15 Oct. 1926), 8 Mitteil.d.G.V. 116 (1927). The Institut de droit international,
which in 1894 had adopted a resolution in favor of a six-mile limit, Rfgles adopties par
l'Institut de droit international sur la difinition et le rigime de la mer territoriale, 1894-95
ANNUAIRE 328, 329, accepted the three-mile limit in 1928. Projet de r~glement relatif a la
mer territoriali en temps de paix, 1928 ANNUAIRE 755, 755 art. 2. The Harvard Research
Project adopted the three-mile limit in 1929. Draft Convention on Territorial Waters, in 23
AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 243, Art. 2 (1929).
231. The other two areas were nationality and state responsibility. The conference
produced the Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws,
Apr. 12, 1930, 179 L.N.T.S. 89 (1937) For a brief discussion of this convention see
BROWNLIE, supra note 90, at 386. The area of state responsibility remains uncodified.
232. Of the nineteen states which supported the three-mile limit, seven asserted that a
contiguous zone should extend outward from it. In the end, the Conference considered "that
the discussions had made apparent divergences of opinion with respect to certain fundamental
questions which, for the moment, do not permit the conclusion of a convention relative to the
territorial sea." See Extrait du Compte Rendu Povisoire de la Treizi~me Seance Tenue le
Jeudi 3 Avril 1930, and Risolution Concernant la Continuation des Travaux sur les Questions
Affirentes aux Eaux Territoriales, in GUSTAVE GUERRERO, LA CODIFICATION DU DROIT
INTERNATIONAL Annex 5, 204, 208 (1930) (author's translation).
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on an alternative. 233 Many authors, including Alfred Verdross, Hans
Kelsen, Charles Rousseau, Paul Reuter, and Alejandro Alvarez, asserted
that no rule of international law existed to regulate the breadth of the
territorial sea.234 Georg Dahm suggested that the situation constituted a
"vollstindige Anarchie. ' '235 Only a few scholars continued to insist on
the applicability of the three-mile rule.236
The fact that many of these writers assumed that a rule had exist-
ed,237 and that that rule had been three miles, was due above all "to the
influence exerted by Great Britain and the United States. 238 Only when
it became clear to these scholars that their best efforts could not arrest
the development of a customary rule establishing the breadth in excess
of three miles did they abandon their support for the supposed three-
mile rule.
As this brief review of the history of the breadth of the territorial
sea demonstrates, "it is meaningless to speak of a single limit for terri-
torial sea claims existing at any one time. 2 39 Nevertheless, Robert
Jennings has argued that the three-mile limit, while having become a
minority position was nonetheless a minimum limit, and therefore the
only standard available against the world. This meant that any claim
exceeding three miles was valid with respect to other states only on an
individual basis through their acquiescence or express consent.2 °
Jennings' position may, however, be questioned in light of the fact
that the breadth of the territorial sea is a boundary rule.24' As has al-
ready been explained, any rule of customary international law concern-
ing the breadth of the territorial sea is the result of a stabilizing of the
tension between the principles of territorial jurisdiction and freedom of
233. O'CONNELL, supra note 144, at 159.
234. See ALEJANDRO ALVAREZ, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL NOUVEAU 533 (1959); HANS
KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 220 (1952); PAUL REUTER, DROIT INTERNA-
TIONAL PUBLIC 217 (1958); CHARLES ROUSSEAU, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 437 (1953);
1 ALFRED VERDROSS, V6LKERRECHT 215 (3d ed. 1955).
235. A "complete anarchy." DAHM, supra note 56, at 655.
236. See, e.g., C. JOHN COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 110 (6th ed.
1967).
237. A notable exception is Charles De Visscher, who asserted that the three-mile limit
had never acquired universal authority. See CHARLES DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 211-12 (P.E. Corbett trans., 1957).
238. O'CONNELL, supra note 144, at 165. This influence, it should be noted, had never
been strong enough to alter the claims and policies of the "dissenting" states.
239. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 227, at 66.
240. R.Y. Jennings, General Course on Principles of Public International Law, 121
R.C.A.D.I. 323, 383 (1967-II).
241. See discussion supra part IV.B.
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the high seas. The rule therefore creates rights and obligations in both
directions at the same time, towards the coastal state in the use of its
coastal waters, and towards all other states in their use of the high
seas.242 Consequently, the breadth of the territorial sea cannot be a
minimum standard in only one direction. Although each state will have
minimum obligations, there can be no such thing as a minimum "rule."
In a boundary situation, indeterminacy does not result in the rule shift-
ing to one side or the other; it remains indeterminate. Only in situations
involving non-boundary rules will the rule settle, in effect, to the bot-
tom, below any confusion of dissenting and disparate state practice. By
not distinguishing between the two types of situations, Jennings sought
to provide a rule where one never existed. The development of the
twelve-mile rule should be regarded as just that - a development -
and not a change of customary international law. 3
This territorial sea example and the state immunity example which
preceded it have important implications for understanding the process of
customary international law. Suppose that a three-mile rule had existed,
by virtue of the fact that a sufficient degree of supporting behavior and
a sufficient absence of opposing behavior had given rise to a customary
rule. In that case, actions contrary to that rule would have been viola-
tions of customary international law, forcing a state wanting to oppose
the rule to choose between violating international law or using the less
effective means of statements to support a change to that rule. In addi-
tion, actions or statements contrary to that old rule would have to be
regarded as contributions to its desuetude before they could be consid-
ered as contributions to a new rule. Therefore; if an old rule exists, the
threshold for the creation of a new rule is higher than if no old rule
exists.
This requirement can have important consequences for those states
which oppose the development or change of a customary rule. As the
threshold for change is higher than it is for development, objections to
change will have a greater effect in terms of arresting or retarding that
change than will objections to development. In other words, the degree
of uniformity of behavior which is sufficient to result in the develop-
242. This is not the case with non-boundary rules which, in any given situation, create
rights in only one direction and obligations in another, with reciprocity occurring in another,
discrete situation.
243. This is not to say that states which excluded others from the waters less than three
miles off their coasts were violating international law. Although there was no rule as to
breadth, coastal states could legally exercise jurisdiction over that area because no state had
ever claimed that the breadth of the territorial sea was less than three miles. Nevertheless, this
was not a minimum rule, but rather a right to exercise jurisdiction in an area where the right
to do so had never been disputed.
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ment of a rule may not be sufficient to change an existing rule. Objec-
tors to the change of a rule will therefore be more likely to arrest that
change than objectors to a development, which are more likely to end
up as persistent objectors to the new rule.2"
Consequently, by believing or causing others to believe in the
preexistence of a three-mile rule and a rule of absolute state immunity,
states and scholars were making it more difficult for new rules to de-
velop in these areas. In this respect the belief in "rules" that never
existed is a good example of the principle of legitimate expectation
qualifying the application of state power in the process of customary
international law.
There are, of course, other possible motives for wanting to believe
in the existence of a rule. Given that international actors seem to prefer
stability and determinacy to instability and indeterminacy, it is under-
standable that many states and jurists preferred to think that rules exist-
ed with respect to the breadth of the territorial sea and state immunity,
even when rules did not exist.245 Indeed, although international law has
traditionally included a presumption in favor of state freedom to act,
many states are uncomfortable with an absence of rules because such an
absence implies that there are no constraints on other states' behavior.2
244. See discussion of persistent objection, supra notes 179-83 and accompanying text.
245. Despite the operation of legitimate expectation, in situations where the threshold
created by a fictional rule is relatively low, the mistaken belief might sometimes promote
change. It may be psychologically easier to change or modify an existing rule than it is to
create a rule in an area where none exists. Lawyers certainly are more comfortable with
modifying laws than they are with creating them. By believing in fictional rules, international
lawyers may enable those rules to be "changed" by state behavior, "progressive development"
through "codification" (which implies that there is something to codify), the contributions of
scholars, the arguments of lawyers, and the determinations of courts. Law creation, on the
other hand, is something lawyers may prefer to leave to diplomats and statesmen, who may
not be as aware as lawyers of the need for new or "modified" rules.
An example of this phenomenon might be the recent expansion of the "right" to humani-
tarian intervention. Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter prohibits intervention except in situations
where, in terms of Chapter VII, there is a threat to or breach of international peace and
security. The situations in northern Iraq, Somalia, Haiti and Rwanda, with the possible
exception of the problem of refugees, do not seem to fall within this context as it has
traditionally been understood. However, instead of changing the rule, or creating a new rule
to allow intervention for humanitarian purposes in situations not threatening to international
peace and security, the international community has chosen to view these as unique situations
justifying ad hoc enlargements of the international peace and security concept. In short, the
international community's interpretation of Chapter VII has arguably been modified without
the text of the Charter having been changed. However, with respect to pre-existing rules
having a higher threshold, as a result of having attracted relatively more supporting behavior,
the pre-existence of the rule will have more of an effect in deterring change than it will have
in promoting it.
246. With respect to the presumption in favor of state freedom to act, see, most famous-
ly, Steamship Lotus, supra note 5, at 18.
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It is, however, striking that with respect to the breadth of the terri-
torial sea the strongest and most widespread assertions as to the exis-
tence of a three-mile rule were made only once it had become apparent
that a more expansive breadth might become law. One possible expla-
nation is that states see little need to articulate and defend the assump-
tions they hold and the practices they engage in when there is no threat
of a new rule, arising. Only once those assumptions and practices are
challenged, when a potential rule appears which may threaten state
interests, do previously unarticulated beliefs rise to the surface. The
principle of legitimate expectation, in this sense, may be used not so
much to oppose new rules as to give legal value to understandings and
practices which previously had not been seen as requiring legal status.
CONCLUSION
This article has sought to demonstrate that the customary process
and certain fundamental, stiuctural principles of international law act to
qualify the self-interested application of power by frequently unequal
states. By examining certain effects of the principles of jurisdiction,
personality, reciprocity, and legitimate expectation, this article has pro-
vided four examples of how the application of state power is qualified
in the process of customary international law. Rules of customary inter-
national law are not strictly the result of short-term, self-interested
applications of state power, but are instead the result of a complex
interaction of shared understandings, different forms of state behavior,
and rules and principles of international law. Power is an important, but
not an exclusive, determining factor in the maintenance, development,
and change of customary rules.
This demonstration of the interactive relationship between law and
power has significant implications for the discipline of international law.
To be truly effective, international lawyers must understand how the
rules with which they work are maintained, developed, and changed.
International lawyers must realize that they can examine the role of state
power and other non-legal factors without jeopardizing the inherent
stability and determinacy of international law. This realization, in turn,
may enable international lawyers to resolve many of the more intracta-
ble problems traditionally associated with their discipline, such as deter-
mining how to prove the existence of customary rules, and whether
treaty obligations can be modified through the subsequent behavior of
states. This realization may also enable international law to reestablish
itself as a serious social science discipline - one that examines an
important sphere of social activity with a view to understanding better
the social process as a whole. International law has much to contribute
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to our knowledge of international relations. Rigorous studies of how
international law affects the behavior of states are long overdue.
This article's demonstration that the customary process and certain
fundamental structural principles of international law act to qualify
applications of state power also has significant implications for the
discipline of international relations. International relations scholars who
have previously dismissed and derided the role of international law may
wish to reevaluate the accuracy of their essentially anarchical picture of
international society. Similarly, for those international relations scholars
who have begun to explore the role of international institutions and
international law, the ideas expressed in this article may confirm their
intuitions and encourage them to join international lawyers in a coopera-
tive study of the complex issues which separate, yet bind, international
politics to international law.
Cooperation is required between the two disciplines because neither
international lawyers nor international relations scholars are indepen-
dently capable of exploring the full extent to which international politics
and international law influence, engage, and interact with one another.
The strengths, experience, and insights of both disciplines are required.
This article, by reevaluating the process of customary international law
from an interdisciplinary perspective, has offered but one possible
starting point for this larger joint venture.
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